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Articles
OPEN ROBOTICS
M. RYAN CALO*
I. INTRODUCTION
Robotics is poised to be the next transformative technology.  Ro-
bots are widely used in manufacturing, warfare, and disaster re-
sponse,1 and the market for personal robotics is exploding.2
Worldwide sales of home robots—such as iRobot’s popular robotic
vacuum cleaner3—are in the millions.4  In fact, Honda has predicted
that by the year 2020, it will sell as many robots as it does cars.5
Microsoft founder Bill Gates believes that the robotics industry is in
the same place today as the personal computer (“PC”) business was in
the 1970s,6 a belief that is significant given that there are now well
over one billion PCs—just three decades after their introduction into
the market.7
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1. E.g., P.W. SINGER, WIRED FOR WAR: THE ROBOTICS REVOLUTION AND CONFLICT IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 7–8 (2009) (noting that robots are being used in the contexts of
manufacturing and warfare).
2. See id. at 8 (estimating that the number of personal robots in the world doubled
between 2004 and 2007 and suggesting that the numbers will continue to expand at higher
rates).
3. See About iRobot, IROBOT, http://www.irobot.com/sp.cfm?pageid=74 (follow “About
Our Robots” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 21, 2011) (noting that more than five million
home robots have been sold worldwide and that the “floor vacuuming robot is leading the
charge”).
4. SINGER, supra note 1, at 7–8 (citing a 2007 United Nations report finding “that R
there were 4.1 million robots around the world working in people’s homes”).
5. Juha Ainoa et al., The Digital Evolution—from Impossible to Spectacular, in BIT BANG:
RAYS TO THE FUTURE 8, 31 (Yrjo¨ Neuvo & Sami Ylo¨nen eds., 2009), available at http://
lib.tkk.fi/Reports/2009/isbn9789522480781.pdf.
6. See Bill Gates, A Robot in Every Home, SCI. AM., Jan. 2007, at 58, 60, available at http:/
/www.cs.virginia.edu/~robins/A_Robot_in_Every_Home.pdf (“The robotics industry faces
many of the same challenges that the personal computer business faced 30 years ago.”).
7. Daniel Lyons, Android Invasion, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 11, 2010, at 42 (calculating the
number of PCs in existence three decades after their introduction).  There may be reason
to believe that the number of robots in the world will increase more quickly than did PCs:
571
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Personal robots under development are sophisticated and versa-
tile.  The Japanese company Kawada Industries recently released the
HRP4, an all-purpose humanoid robot that is, according to one re-
porter, “quite definitely, a sign of the guest-greeting, vacuum-pushing,
room-tidying, mail-delivering household robot revolution about to
come.”8  Intel has designed the Home Exploring Robotic Butler
(“HERB”), a personal robot that can follow basic commands such as
“‘please clean this mess.’”9  The Silicon Valley startup Willow Garage
recently released the Personal Robot 2 (“PR2”), which researchers
have already programmed to fold laundry and to retrieve items from a
refrigerator.10
Like today’s PCs, tomorrow’s personal robots will have operating
systems and run software.11  They will be able to connect with one
another and to the Internet,12 and the hope is that they will be capa-
ble of a wide variety of tasks limited only by end-user imagination.13
It took only one-third of the time for as many smart phones to be in use as household PCs.
Id.
8. Kit Eaton, AIST’s HRP4: Sci-Fi-Like Household Helper Robots Have Arrived, FAST COM-
PANY (Sept. 15, 2010), http://www.fastcompany.com/1689179/aists-hrp4-sci-fi-like-house-
hold-helper-robots-seem-to-have-arrived.  Kawada Industries collaborated with the National
Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology in developing the HRP4. Mecha-
tronics—Introduction, KAWADA INDUSTRIES, INC., http://global.kawada.jp/mechatronics/in-
dex.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2011).  The National Institute of Advanced Industrial
Science and Technology was responsible for “total specification design.” Mechatronics—
Introduction, supra.
9. Robert S. Boyd, Robots Are Narrowing the Gap with Humans, MCCLATCHY (Apr. 20,
2009), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2009/04/20/66530/robots-are-narrowing-the-gap-
with.html.  Boyd also describes a “Robobusiness” conference in which companies “demon-
strated a robot firefighter, gardener, receptionist, tour guide and security guard.” Id.
10. See admin, Beer Me, Robot, WILLOW GARAGE (July 6, 2010, 3:42 PM), http://www.
willowgarage.com/blog/2010/07/06/beer-me-robot (announcing success in program-
ming a robot to deliver—and open—beer); Donald Melanson, UC Berkeley Researchers Teach
PR2 Robot to Fold Towels, ENGADGET (Apr. 5, 2010, 10:21 PM), http://www.engadget.com/
2010/04/05/uc-berkeley-researchers-teach-pr2-robot-to-fold-towels (explaining how the
PR2 folds towels).  Future plans involve everything from setting a table to pouring liquid
into a cup. See Press Release, Willow Garage, Willow Garage Gives Away 11 Robots Worth
Over $4 Million to Accelerate Robotics Applications & Research (May 4, 2010), available at
http://www.willowgarage.com/sites/default/files/media/2010-04-04-Willow%20Garage
%20PR2%20Release%20May%202010%20FINAL.pdf (announcing the institutional and
academic recipients of a PR2 robot giveaway and describing their projects, which were all
designed to “make rigorous and creative use of the robots”).
11. See infra Part III.
12. See, e.g., Tamara Denning et al., A Spotlight on Security and Privacy Risks with Future
Household Robots: Attacks and Lessons, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 11TH INTERNATIONAL CONFER-
ENCE ON UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING 105, 106–07 (2009), available at http://dub.washington.
edu/djangosite/media/papers/p105-denning.pdf (discussing two commercial robots able
to connect to the Internet).
13. Cf. id. at 113 (expecting “a greater number of increasingly sophisticated robots to
be used in the home for diverse tasks”).
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But unlike PCs, personal robots will have “actuators” that enable phys-
ical interaction with the external world.14
Many discussions of robotics and the law focus on legal responsi-
bility for autonomous agents or on the possibility of robot rights.15
That is not my focus here.  In this Article, I will advance several hy-
potheses about the commercial prospects of robotics16 in the United
States.  I will argue that to fulfill its enormous promise personal robot-
ics17 must be sufficiently “open” to third party innovation and that
paving the way toward such openness may require modest legal
intervention.
In Part II, I will briefly describe a recurrent theme in cyberlaw
scholarship, namely the suggestion that openness of various kinds
leads to greater innovation.  In Part III, I will present two visions of
personal robotics, one “closed” and the other “open.”18  By “closed,” I
mean that the robot has a set function, runs only proprietary
software,19 and cannot be physically altered by the consumer.  The
14. See id. at 112 (“The actuators will dictate what physical assets the robot can affect
and the ways that it can physically assist in an attack scenario.”).
15. For two early, but excellent, examples of such scholarship, see Sam N. Lehman-
Wilzig, Frankenstein Unbound: Towards a Legal Definition of Artificial Intelligence, FUTURES, Dec.
1981, at 442, and Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences, 70 N.C. L.
REV. 1231 (1992).  For a discussion that asks whether a robot could assert rights or be
subject to criminal liability, see also CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, EARTH AND OTHER ETHICS: THE
CASE FOR MORAL PLURALISM 12, 26–31 (1987).  For a recent and short, but interesting,
discussion about the perceived threats that artificial intelligence may pose to humans, see
generally John O. McGinnis, Accelerating AI, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1253 (2010).
16. Robots differ from other technologies in that they combine three elements that
acting together enable them to function as artificial organisms: sensors, processors, and
effectors. SINGER, supra note 1, at 67.  Effectors (or actuators) are components that enable R
the robot to act upon the external world. Id.
17. When using the term “personal robotics,” I refer to robots for personal, service, or
business use, as distinct from military or manufacturing uses.  I also focus on standalone
robots, as opposed to distributed or embedded robotics.
18. In this sense, my project echoes that of Professor Jonathan Zittrain with respect to
networked computing platforms. See JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET—
AND HOW TO STOP IT 3–5 (2008) [hereinafter ZITTRAIN, FUTURE OF THE INTERNET] (sug-
gesting that the future will bring “sterile appliances tethered to a network of control,” which
inhibit the ability of “mainstream technology [to] be influenced, even revolutionized, out
of left field”); Jonathan L. Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1974, 1976
(2006) [hereinafter Zittrain, Generative Internet] (explaining that the Internet was “built to
be open to any sort of device . . . so long as it was properly interfaced” and acknowledging
that “the openness of the Internet and the PC to third-party contribution is now so persis-
tent and universal as to seem inevitable”).
19. See infra Part III.A.  There is certainly an important role for proprietary software to
the extent that an inability to protect intellectual property rights could also stifle innova-
tion. Cf. Zittrain, Generative Internet, supra note 18, at 1978–79 (suggesting that, because R
“[p]roprietary systems can remain ‘open’ . . . by permitting unaffiliated third parties to
write superseding programs and permitting PC owners to install these programs without
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popular Roomba robotic vacuum cleaner and the first Artificial Intelli-
gence roBOt (“AIBO”) mechanical pet are closed in this sense.20  By
“open,” I mean nondedicated use, nondiscriminatory software, and
modular design.21  The Swiss-designed e-puck robot is a paradigmatic
example of an open robot.22  It has no predetermined function (aside
from the general goals of education and research), runs third party
open source software, and can be physically altered and extended
without compromising performance.23
Open robotics, I will argue, could lead to rapid innovation and
growth within the personal robotics sector, just as open computers
contributed to the success of personal computing.24  Closed robotics,
however, will move forward more slowly as companies design—and
requiring any gatekeeping by the [operating system] provider,” the focus of “debates about
the future of our PC experience” should be on “generative versus nongenerative: under-
standing which platforms will remain open to third-party innovation and which will not”).
20. Consumer pressure ultimately led iRobot to develop the Create, a programmable
“robot for tinkerers.” See Don Woligroski, Robotic R&D with the Son of Roomba, TOM’S HARD-
WARE (May 14, 2007, 11:03 PM), http://www.tomshardware.com/reviews/irobot-create-
20070515,1602-2.html (attributing the production of the Create to the popularity among
robotics fans of the Roomba, another iRobot model).  The Create is a more open version
of the Roomba, which consumers can “hack.” See Khalid Hosein, iRobot Create—Program-
mable Roomba-Like Robot, GIZMOS FOR GEEKS (Jan. 12, 2007), http://www.gizmosforgeeks.
com/2007/01/12/irobot-create-programmable-roomba-like-robot/1252 (contrasting the
Roomba and the Create in terms of their “hackability”).  Similarly, Sony eventually opened
the AIBO platform in response to consumer demand. See infra text accompanying notes
115–24. R
21. See infra Part III.A.  These are not the only qualities in the field of personal robotics
that support innovation and adoption.  There must also be a critical mass of standardiza-
tion so that third parties can program software and build hardware for multiple platforms,
thus enabling a critical mass of adoption. See infra notes 152–56 and accompanying text. R
22. See Francesco Mondada et al., The e-puck, a Robot Designed for Education in Engineer-
ing, in 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 9TH CONFERENCE ON AUTONOMOUS ROBOT SYSTEMS AND COM-
PETITIONS 59, 60 (2009), available at http://infoscience.epfl.ch/record/135236/files/
epuck-robotica2009.pdf (explaining the e-puck’s design as “[a]n open source hardware/
software development model”).
23. Id. at 60–61, 63 (describing e-puck features).  Other examples of open robots in-
clude (1) KUKA’s youBot (Germany), see Key Features, KUKA, http://www.kuka-
youbot.com/en (last visited Mar. 21, 2011) (“desktop mobile manipulator”); (2) LEGO’s
Mindstorms (Denmark), see Products, LEGO MINDSTORMS, http://mindstorms.lego.com/en-
us/products/default.aspx (last visited Mar. 21, 2011) (“customisable programming”); (3)
Robosoft’s Kompaı¨ (France), see RobuBOX-Kompaı¨ Now Available in Open Source, NEWS FROM
ROBOSOFT (May 3, 2010), http://robosoftnews.wordpress.com/2010/04/28/robubox-
kompai-now-available-in-open-source/; (4) Fujisoft’s PALRO (Japan), see Robot Technologies:
Features, FUJISOFT, http://157.120.140.213/e/solutions/robot_technologies/features.html
(last visited Mar. 21, 2011) (open architecture software); and (5) the iCub (European
Union), see Who I Am, ICUB.ORG, http://www.icub.org (last visited Mar. 21, 2011) (“open
source cognitive humanoid robotic platform”).
24. See ZITTRAIN, FUTURE OF THE INTERNET, supra note 18, at 19 (identifying a “crucial R
element of the PC’s success” as the fact that “it is generative: it is open to reprogramming
and thus repurposing by anyone”).
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some consumers purchase—a series of robot appliances, each dedi-
cated to a particular task.25  No secondary professional market for
software or hardware can accompany an entirely closed robotics
industry.26
Many contemporary technologies, including telephones, televi-
sions, computers, and the Internet, have thrived despite well-docu-
mented hurdles to openness.27  In Part IV, I will predict that open
robotics will confront an additional hurdle: the potential for crippling
legal liability, which may lead entrepreneurs and investors to abandon
open robots in favor of robots with more limited functionality.  This
possibility flows from a key difference between computers and robots.
Although robots, like computers have no set function,28 robots are in
a position to cause physical damage and injury directly, which com-
puters cannot do.29
Legal liability for computer-caused injury was a nonstarter,30 and
U.S. courts quickly headed off the prospect of software liability
through doctrines such as economic loss.31  People also came to ex-
pect and accept that computers would have glitches.32
25. See, e.g., Trust Me, I’m a Robot, ECONOMIST, June 10, 2006, at 78 (“It is more likely,
[Colin Angle of iRobot] believes, that robots will be relatively dumb machines designed for
particular tasks.  Rather than a humanoid robot maid, ‘it’s going to be a heterogeneous
swarm of robots that will take care of the house,’ he says.”); cf. ZITTRAIN, FUTURE OF THE
INTERNET, supra note 18, at 19–20 (describing a counterfactual in which, if the personal R
computer had not been open to reprogramming, people would instead use different dedi-
cated all-in-one units for different tasks).
26. Cf. Zittrain, Generative Internet, supra note 18, at 1976 (describing the PC as “easily R
reconfigurable by its users for any number of purposes” and explaining that “[t]he audi-
ence writing software for PCs . . . is itself massive and varied.  This diverse audience has
driven the variety of applications powering the rapid technological innovation to which we
have become accustomed” (footnote omitted)).
27. See, e.g., ZITTRAIN, FUTURE OF THE INTERNET, supra note 18, at 36–38 (describing the R
first Internet worm, which “was the first large-scale demonstration of a vulnerability of
generativity”).
28. This is true by definition. Cf. Zittrain, Generative Internet, supra note 18, at 1980–81 R
(defining “generativity”—a technology’s ability “to produce unprompted change driven by
large, varied, and uncoordinated audiences”—as “a function of a technology’s capacity for
leverage across a range of tasks, adaptability to a range of different tasks, ease of mastery,
and accessibility”).
29. See infra notes 163–66 and accompanying text. R
30. See, e.g., Transp. Corp. of Am. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 30 F.3d 953, 955–56, 960
(8th Cir. 1994) (rejecting claim against computer manufacturer for economic loss result-
ing from computer failure).
31. See infra text accompanying note 193. R
32. See David E. Jordan, The Tortious Computer—When Does EDP Become Errant Data
Processing?, 4 COMPUTER L. SERV. § 5-1, art. 2, at 4, 8 (1972) (acknowledging an “implicit
acceptance of the fallibility of computers” and suggesting that computer users may be
“consciously accepting the risks of defects and operational difficulties in new equipment,
in preference to delaying purchase until the ‘bugs’ have been worked out”).
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Lawsuits alleging physical harm from computers and software,
however, can and do gain traction.33  Such incidents usually involve a
dedicated medical, navigation, or other system not performing as it
should.34  There has yet to be a test case for liability where a nondedi-
cated robotic platform35 caused physical harm.  The resulting legal
uncertainty could discourage the flow of capital into robotics or other-
wise narrow robot functionality, placing the United States behind
other countries with a higher bar to litigation and a head start on
research, development, and production.36
Finally, in Part V, I will propose a tentative compromise between
the need to foster innovation and the need to incentivize safety.  Spe-
cifically, I will argue that Congress should shield manufacturers and
distributors of open robotic platforms from suit for what consumers
do with their personal robots, just as it immunizes gun manufacturers
from suit for what some people do with guns37 and websites operators
for what users upload and post.38  A selective immunity would give
open robotics some breathing room until industry standards, norms,
or other solutions emerge.  In this Part, I will also briefly explore the
33. See infra text accompanying notes 196–205.  Computers and software with physical R
ramifications, such as those that control a car’s navigation, acceleration, or brakes, are
generally single purpose. Cf., e.g., Karim Nice, How Car Computers Work, HOWSTUFFWORKS,
http://auto.howstuffworks.com/under-the-hood/trends-innovations/car-computer.htm
(last visited Mar. 21, 2011) (noting that “[c]ars today might have as many as 50
microprocessors on them,” such as the engine control unit, the antilock braking system
module, and the transmission controller).  These computers and software are supposed to
do one task, safely.  When they fail to do that task, it is easier to make the case for manufac-
turer’s liability. See infra notes 167–77 and accompanying text.  As I will argue in Part IV, R
we cannot assume that consumers, juries, and courts will distinguish between the many
possible causes of a multipurpose personal robot’s malfunction that has injured someone.
34. For examples of cases that illustrate this point, see sources cited infra notes 200–05. R
35. By “robotic platform,” I mean a basic system comprised of a processor, sensors, and
one or more actuators.  Robotic platforms constitute functioning robots but may require
the addition of task-specific hardware. See SINGER, supra note 1, at 25 (describing one such R
platform).
36. See infra text accompanying notes 271–81. R
37. See Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (“PLCAA”), 15 U.S.C.
§ 7901(b)(1) (2006) (listing prohibition of “causes of action against manufacturers, dis-
tributors, dealers, and importers of firearms or ammunitions products, and their trade
associations, for the harm solely caused by the criminal or unlawful misuse of firearm prod-
ucts or ammunition products by others when the product functioned as designed and in-
tended” as one of the purposes of PLCAA).
38. See, e.g., Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act (“OCILLA”), 17
U.S.C. § 512(a)(1) (2006) (shielding service providers from liability for copyright infringe-
ment when the infringing content’s transmission was initiated by a third party); cf. Commu-
nications Decency Act (“CDA”) of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006) (“No provider or
user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
information provided by another information content provider.”).
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possibility of a small-scale market for individual robot insurance, with
rates and premiums calibrated to the robot’s capacity to cause harm.
The time to think through this problem is now.  Roboticists and
investors are already making decisions that will determine the fate of
the personal robotics industry in the United States.39  Indeed, the first
multipurpose robots have already hit the commercial market.40
Meanwhile, other countries have already recognized the enormous
promise of personal and service robots, and as a result they have in-
creased investment and set aggressive goals.41  By taking a wait and see
approach, the United States risks missing out on this decade’s trans-
formative technology.42
II. FROM OPENNESS TO INNOVATION
Over the course of its relatively short history, cyberlaw has been
host to several key discussions.  Among the earliest was the debate
around cyberspace’s supposed exceptionalism.43  This debate has sev-
eral aspects.  There is the question, for instance, whether we need new
law to deal with cyberspace or whether existing laws are adequate.44
39. See COMPUTING CMTY. CONSORTIUM WORKSHOP ON EMERGING TECHS. & TRENDS, A
ROADMAP FOR U.S. ROBOTICS: FROM INTERNET TO ROBOTICS 1 (May 21, 2009) [hereinafter
ROADMAP FOR U.S. ROBOTICS], available at http://www.us-robotics.us/reports/
CCC%20Report.pdf  (arguing that although there have been “tremendous advancements
in robotics technology” over the past five years, the United States “lags behind other coun-
tries in recognizing the importance of robotics technology” and “U.S. investment, outside
unmanned systems for defense purposes, remains practically non-existent” (emphasis
omitted)).
40. See supra notes 8–10 and accompanying text. R
41. See, e.g., OLIVER BROCK & RODERIC GRUPEN, FINAL REPORT OF THE NSF/NASA WORK-
SHOP ON AUTONOMOUS MOBILE MANIPULATION 6 (Aug. 8, 2005), available at http://www-
robotics.cs.umass.edu/~grupen/AMMReport-2005-08-08.pdf (reporting that countries in
Europe and Asia have made “significant financial investments in research activities associ-
ated with humanoid robotics and mobile manipulation”).
42. See ROADMAP FOR U.S. ROBOTICS, supra note 39, at 1 (“Unless this situation can be R
addressed in the near future, the United States runs the risk of abdicating our ability to
globally compete in these emerging markets and putting the nation at risk of having to rely
on the rest of the world to provide a critical technology that our population will become
increasingly dependent upon.”); cf. Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-
End: Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925,
956–57 (2001) (criticizing a “wait and see” approach to allowing cable companies to elimi-
nate Internet service provider competition because “[i]t may be impossible to measure the
loss of innovation that results”).
43. David W. Opderbeck, Deconstructing Jefferson’s Candle: Towards a Critical Realist Ap-
proach to Cultural Environmentalism and Information Policy, 49 JURIMETRICS J. 203, 239 (2009)
(“The first generation of cyberlaw scholarship was split between exceptionalists and
unexceptionalists, who respectively viewed cyberspace either as a newly constructed auton-
omous realm or as nothing but people sitting in front of computer terminals.”).
44. See, e.g., David G. Post, Governing Cyberspace: Law, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 883, 891–92 (2008) (explaining the exceptionalists’ view that the “signifi-
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The question arose very early in the context of computers,45 culminat-
ing in an exchange between Judge Frank Easterbrook and Professor
Lawrence Lessig about the Internet in the late 1990s.46  Judge Easter-
brook contended that there was no more a need for a separate law of
cyberspace than there was a need for a separate “Law of the Horse.”47
Professor Lessig responded by detailing the lessons of cyberspace for
law generally.48
A distinct debate arose from early claims that cyberspace would
disrupt existing notions of sovereignty.49  Professor James Boyle
coined the term “libertarian gotcha” to encompass the idea that gov-
ernments rely on the Internet for its economic promise while simulta-
neously being incapable of governing activity there.50  As Professor
Lessig describes in his seminal book Code, scholars went so far as to
predict that citizens of the web would be able to select how they would
be governed by choosing between competing online communities.51
Professor Lessig wrote Code in part as a response to this debate, argu-
ing not only that cyberspace could be regulated but also that the par-
cant effects principle” used to determine jurisdiction in international cases is insufficient
vis-a`-vis the Internet).
45. In 1963, for instance, Harvey Levin opined that any problems arising from com-
puter systems were factual and would “fit within the recognized principles of tort law.”
Harvey B. Levin, Automation and the Law of Torts, PRAC. LAW., Dec. 1963, at 83, 90; see also
Jordan, supra note 32, at 4 (“There do not appear to be any conceptual problems in the R
extension of product liability into the field of computers.”).
46. Compare Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 207, 215–16 (arguing in favor of facilitating the ability of “participants in this
evolving world to make their own decisions” rather than trying to “match an imperfect
legal system to an evolving world that we understand poorly”), with Lawrence Lessig, The
Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501, 501–02 (1999) (dis-
agreeing with Judge Easterbrook’s belief that there is no value to “thinking in particular
about how law and cyberspace connect”).  The reference to “The Law of the Horse” dates
back to Karl Llewellyn’s discussion of idiosyncratic contract rules. Lessig, supra, at 501 n.1.
47. See Easterbrook, supra note 46, at 207–08 (asserting that although there are many R
cases that deal with horses in some way, “[a]ny effort to collect these strands into a [law
school] course on ‘The Law of the Horse’ is doomed to be shallow and to miss unifying
principles,” and analogizing “The Law of the Horse” to “Property in Cyberspace”).
48. Lessig, supra note 46, at 502 (“By working through these examples of law interact- R
ing with cyberspace, we will throw into relief a set of general questions about law’s regula-
tion outside of cyberspace.”).
49. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0, at 294–310 (2006) (explaining
the notion of conflicting sovereignties in the context of cyberspace and mapping out three
possible resolutions to the conflict). Professor Lessig explains that cyberspace inhabitants
are simultaneously subject to norms of “a community in real space,” as well as those of “a
cyberspace community.” Id. at 298–99.
50. Id. at 3.
51. Id. at 288.
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ticular way in which it is subject to regulation may render it uniquely
susceptible to control.52
Today, technology policy is dominated by another set of debates,
unified—if at all—by a common concern over the best conditions for
innovation and competition.53  Though the technologies at issue di-
verge, a significant number of commentators consistently evidence a
need for greater openness to third party innovation.54
Several distinct conversations take place under this mantle.  One
involves the types of devices consumers may connect to a given net-
work.  AT&T originally fought the use of non-AT&T equipment on its
network, citing operational concerns.55  Cable companies continue to
make essentially the same argument in connection with television set-
top boxes.56  The counterargument to these claims is that opening
telephone and cable networks to third party device manufacturers is
safe, permits healthy competition, and incentivizes device
innovation.57
52. See id. at 5 (introducing the notion that “‘code is law,’” which demands an under-
standing of how, in cyberspace, “a different ‘code’ regulates—how the software and hard-
ware (i.e., the ‘code’ of cyberspace) that make cyberspace what it is also regulate
cyberspace as it is”).  Professor Lessig also suggested that a preference for open source
code over proprietary or closed code would help safeguard the conditions for democracy.
Id. at 149–51.  This preference results because “[t]o the extent that code is open code, the
power of government is constrained. Government can demand, government can threaten,
but when the target of its regulation is plastic, it cannot rely on its target remaining as it
wants.” Id. at 150.
53. See, e.g., Frank Pasquale, Beyond Innovation and Competition: The Need for Qualified
Transparency in Internet Intermediaries, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 105, 124 (2010) (“Innovation has
been the central focus of Internet law and policy.  While leading commentators sharply
divide on the best way to promote innovation, they routinely elevate its importance.” (foot-
note omitted)).
54. See, e.g., id. at 125 (“Innovation is the goal; competition is the means for achieving
it. . . .  [Indeed,] Lessig and other advocates of network neutrality worry that the owners of
the ‘pipes’ that carry communications may impede . . . innovation by favoring their own
applications.”).
55. See In re Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Tel. Serv., 13 F.C.C.2d 420,
424 (1968) (describing AT&T’s argument that the telephone companies “must have abso-
lute control over the quality, installation, and maintenance of all parts of the [telephone]
system in order effectively to carry out [their] responsibility [to establish, operate and im-
prove the system]”).  As of this writing, Apple’s popular iPhone was also limited by default
to a single provider. See Shayndi Raice & Yukari Iwatani Kane, Verizon Finally Lands the
iPhone, WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 2011, at B1 (“The iPhone is finally coming to Verizon.”).
56. See, e.g., Gen. Instrument Corp. v. FCC, 213 F.3d 724, 730–31 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (ex-
plaining cable companies’ argument that a federal regulation requiring separation of se-
curity and other set-top cable box functions would jeopardize security).
57. See, e.g., In re Implementation of Section 304 of the Telecomms. Act of 1996, 13
F.C.C. Rcd. 14775, 14776 (1998) (defining “navigation devices” as “the equipment used to
access video programming and other services from multichannel video programming sys-
tems” and explaining that the purpose of Section 629 of the Act and the FCC rules
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A second conversation concerns the conditions under which an
Internet provider may block, slow down, or otherwise discriminate
against traffic over its network.58  Professor Tim Wu coined the term
“net neutrality”59 to stand for the principle that network providers
should respect the original, application-neutral architecture of the In-
ternet.60  This debate also centers on whether excessive network man-
agement will dampen competition and innovation.61  Professor
Barbara van Schewick, for instance, has developed a technological
and economic model detailing precisely how variance from the end-
to-end principle and other design aspects of the early Internet is likely
to affect innovation by startups and other firms.62
Noting a trend away from PCs that can run any software and to-
ward tethered appliances that run only what the provider allows, Pro-
fessor Jonathan Zittrain focuses on an analogous concern about the
nature of computing devices.63  Innovation is also at the heart of Pro-
fessor Zittrain’s argument: He shows how tethered appliances such as
the iPhone are less “generative” than PCs, meaning that such devices
are not capable of supporting the same level of creativity and innova-
tion.64  Professor Zittrain suggests that this development reflects the
adopted were “to expand opportunities to purchase [navigation devices] from sources
other than the service provider”); Kevin Werbach, Higher Standards: Regulation in the Network
Age, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 179, 193–94 (2009) (arguing that the FCC’s landmark decision
in Carterfone to allow interconnection of third party devices with the telephone network
ultimately sparked competition and innovation in network-attached devices).
58. See, e.g., Susan P. Crawford, The Internet and the Project of Communications Law, 55
UCLA L. REV. 359, 395–98 (2007) (arguing that network discrimination, the practice of
“allowing network-access providers to treat some traffic or some users differently,” is eco-
nomically destructive).
59. Preston Gralla, Apple Is Number One Danger to Internet Freedom, Says Columbia Professor,
COMPUTERWORLD (Nov. 15, 2010, 11:16 AM), http://blogs.computerworld.com/17354/
apple_is_number_one_danger_to_internet_freedom_says_columbia_professor.
60. See Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 141, 145–46 (2003) (defining and making the case for “a neutral network,” which
is “an Internet that does not favor one application (say, the world wide web), over others
(say, email)”).
61. Id.; Pasquale, supra note 53, at 125–28. R
62. See generally BARBARA VAN SCHEWICK, INTERNET ARCHITECTURE AND INNOVATION
(2010) (explaining the author’s model for study of the Internet’s architecture and design
principles and how constraints on the architecture impact innovation).
63. See ZITTRAIN, FUTURE OF THE INTERNET, supra note 18, at 3 (“The future is not one R
of generative PCs attached to a generative network.  It is instead one of sterile appliances
tethered to a network of control.”). But see Sharon Eisner Gillet et al., Do Appliances
Threaten Internet Innovation?, IEEE COMM. MAG., Oct. 2001, at 46, 47, 50 (concluding that
whether Internet appliances—devices that connect to the Internet and have a fixed func-
tion—pose a threat to innovation “depends on the class of appliance”).
64. ZITTRAIN, FUTURE OF THE INTERNET, supra note 18, at 2–3.  Zittrain also reintroduces R
a concern over the capacity of tethered appliances to support “‘perfect’ law enforcement.”
Id. at 110–23.
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MLR\70-3\MLR301.txt unknown Seq: 11  5-MAY-11 15:36
2011] OPEN ROBOTICS 581
tension between the ideal of generativity and the need to lock down
platforms because of risks to individual and national information
security.65
Another debate centers around user-generated content, espe-
cially the extent to which websites should be held responsible for the
unlawful content that users post.66  This debate is to some extent obvi-
ated by federal law, which protects websites for user copyright viola-
tions under certain conditions67 and under which most other
questions of liability are preempted.68  Nevertheless, arguments regu-
larly surface over the scope of these laws and how they are policed.69
Innovation tends to be at the forefront of these exchanges, as well:
Websites would not provide unfettered communications platforms or
support user-generated content, the argument runs, if they could be
held liable for anything anyone said or did on those platforms.70
The preceding is not intended as an exhaustive description of the
expansive field of cyberlaw.71  But it does suggest a certain recurrent
insight: The more open a platform, network, or device is to third party
65. See id. at 43 (arguing that there may come a “breaking point” at which there are so
many breaches of cybersecurity that “people will come to prefer security to generativity”).
66. See, e.g., Assaf Hamdani, Who’s Liable for Cyberwrongs?, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 901,
901–09, 949–52 (2002) (introducing a framework for liability of Internet service providers
after concluding that the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 did not sufficiently
address the divergence in its regulation of Internet service providers); Nancy S. Kim, Web
Site Proprietorship and Online Harassment, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 993, 997 (arguing that website
sponsors should be liable in tort for online harassment on grounds of “unreasonable busi-
ness models” and “irresponsible and harmful business practices”).
67. See OCILLA, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006) (providing a safe harbor for Internet service
providers hosting third party content as long as the providers implement a takedown
procedure).
68. See CDA, 47 U.S.C. § 230(e) (2006) (explaining the effect of the Act on other laws);
see also supra note 38 (noting that § 230(c)(1) exempts service providers from liability). R
69. Cf. supra note 66. R
70. The preamble to the CDA lists as a purpose of the statute “preserv[ing] the vibrant
and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive
computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2); see
also Eric Goldman, Unregulating Online Harassment, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. ONLINE 59, 60
(2010), http://www.denverlawreview.org/how-to-regulate/2010/2/22/unregulating-on-
line-harassment.html (arguing that “Congress made a great (non)regulatory decision” in
enacting § 230, which “correlates with the beginning of the dot com boom—one of the
most exciting entrepreneurial periods ever”).
71. For instance, it makes no mention of privacy, security, or digital rights manage-
ment (“DRM”) under copyright law.  For a thorough discussion of privacy in the digital
age, see DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON
THE INTERNET 4 (2007) (“This book will take a journey through the ways in which private
lives are being exposed online, and it will examine the implications. . . .  I will propose a
framework for how we can address these problems—by recognizing a new and broader
notion of privacy and by reaching a better balance between privacy and free speech.”).  For
a discussion of the perils of DRM that is skeptical of its protection, see generally Julie E.
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contribution, the more innovation it supports.72  At a minimum, open
networks, devices, and platforms support secondary markets.73  Few
would risk entering the business of developing new set-top cable boxes
without a guarantee that they would work properly when connected to
the cable system.  Fewer novel applications would be funded if inves-
tors suspected that those applications would be blocked or slowed by
Internet service providers or rejected by major platform owners.74
III. TOWARD AN OPEN ROBOTICS
In short, few stories of transformative technology seem able to
avoid the question of openness.75  Personal robotics is no exception.
It too faces a choice between a closed and an open model.76  Closed,
proprietary robotics will move at whatever pace robotics companies
are individually capable of setting.77  Innovation within open robotics
could move at a dramatically faster pace and lead to an accompanying
vibrant market for third party software, components, and accesso-
ries.78  Companies like Willow Garage are betting on an open
model.79  They believe that the application or use that causes a critical
mass to adopt robots will come from unexpected quarters.80
Cohen, Some Reflections on Copyright Management Systems and Laws Designed to Protect Them, 12
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 161 (1997).
72. See, e.g., Zittrain, Generative Internet, supra note 18, at 1976 (explaining that the R
“massive and varied” audience writing software for personal computers “has driven the
variety of applications powering the rapid technological innovation to which we have be-
come accustomed”).
73. ZITTRAIN, FUTURE OF THE INTERNET, supra note 18, at 15–17. R
74. See, e.g., Pasquale, supra note 53, at 125 (“YouTube might never have developed if R
Verizon could have throttled it in favor of its own video sharing site . . . .”).
75. See, e.g., ZITTRAIN, FUTURE OF THE INTERNET, supra note 18, at 84–85 (discussing the R
benefits of generativity to the development of both computers and the Internet).
76. According to a recent European report, “One requirement for a robotics break-
through is that the market has to become a diverse ecosystem of actors like the PC indus-
try.”  Petri Mannonen et al., Cut the Last Cord by Nanolution, in BIT BANG: RAYS TO THE
FUTURE, supra note 5, at 103, 129. R
77. Cf. ZITTRAIN, FUTURE OF THE INTERNET, supra note 18, at 2 (contrasting the genera- R
tive Apple II PC with the closed nature of the iPhone, whose innovations come from Apple
alone).
78. Cf. id. at 15–17 (describing this process for the personal computer).
79. See N.V., Helping Hands, ECONOMIST: BABBAGE BLOG (May 27, 2010, 8:12 PM), http:/
/www.economist.com/blogs/babbage/2010/05/techview_robot_every_home [hereinafter
N.V., Helping Hands] (suggesting that Willow Garage’s open source software, reflective of
its open source business model, “is in a strong position to become the industry’s de facto
standard—in short, the Microsoft Windows of robotics”).
80. Id. (describing Willow Garage’s giveaway of eleven robots and software develop-
ment kits to research groups as predicated on “[t]he hope . . . that someone, somewhere,
will come up with the killer app that kick-starts the whole of the personal-robot industry”).
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These visions are neither cleanly delineated nor mutually exclu-
sive.  The robotics industry could offer single function robots using
proprietary software while simultaneously offering one or more open
robotic platforms.  Indeed, this model is already in use: iRobot offers
the Roomba but also the Create, an open platform for experimenta-
tion.81  Moreover, a system is unlikely to be entirely closed or entirely
open by my definition.82  For instance, the commercially available Par-
rot AR.Drone and iRobot AVA prototypes are hard physically to alter
but allow for third party applications.83  The important question is
whether, overall, robotics will be sufficiently open to promote adop-
tion and innovation on a scale comparable with computers and the
Internet.84
A. Closed Versus Open Robots
Closed robots resemble any contemporary appliance: They are
designed to perform a set task.85  They run proprietary software and
are no more amenable to tinkering than a dishwasher.86  Open robots
are just the opposite.  By definition, they invite third party
contribution.87
Robots are open insofar as they have three related characteristics:
(1) they lack a set function; (2) they accept third party software;88 and
81. See supra note 20.  iRobot also offers the Warrior, which, as P. W. Singer describes, R
“is really just a mobile platform, with a [Universal Serial Bus (“USB”)] port on top.  USB
ports are the universal connectors used to plug anything into a computer, from your
mouse to a printer.” SINGER, supra note 1, at 25.  Singer goes on to describe how a Warrior R
could be fitted with weapons for battle, or with an iPod and loudspeakers for a “mobile
rave party.” SINGER, supra note 1, at 25. R
82. See infra Part III.B.
83. See, e.g., Lance Ulanoff, iRobot’s AVA Is an App-Ready Robot, PCMAG.COM (Jan. 6,
2011, 1:35 PM), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2375313,00.asp (describing the
compatibility of AVA with third party applications); PARROT AR.DRONE, http://ar-
drone.parrot.com/parrot-ar-drone/usa (last visited Mar. 23, 2011).
84. Cf. ZITTRAIN, FUTURE OF THE INTERNET, supra note 18, at 18 (discussing the impor- R
tant contribution of generative technologies to the development of computer technology).
85. iRobot, for instance, sells robots designed for pool cleaning, floor washing, vacuum
cleaning, shop sweeping, and gutter cleaning. IROBOT: CLEANING ROBOTS, http://
store.irobot.com/shop/index.jsp?categoryId=2804605 (last visited Mar. 6, 2011).  These
products are current as of 2011; more may be developed, others discontinued.  This Article
concerns the direction of companies like iRobot with respect to consumer robotics.
86. This limitation has not stopped some people from finding ways to tinker with the
functions of these single-task robots.  For example, to learn how to make a Roomba sing
and connect to the Internet, see TOD E. KURT, HACKING ROOMBA (2006). But see infra text
accompanying notes 119–20 (describing efforts by Sony to stop tinkering with its AIBO R
product).
87. Cf. supra note 20 (discussing the openness of iRobot’s Create). R
88. By “third party,” I mean to exclude the manufacturer and its affiliates and
subcontractors.
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(3) they are modular in hardware design.89  This combination of fac-
tors, coupled with a sufficient degree of standardization, could sup-
port the conditions enjoyed in the early days of the PC and the
Internet.90  They will help make personal robots more generative, to
borrow a concept from Professor Zittrain.91  In addition, they may ac-
celerate innovation and consumer adoption of robots.92
1. Multifunctionality
Early computers came bundled with customized proprietary
software.93  Customers tended to be businesses in need of processing
power to accomplish one particular service.94  The rise of the personal
home computer owes its beginnings to a different trend—individuals
and firms that began to create platforms that were cheaper and less
powerful but also much more versatile.95  Personal computer sales
were driven as much by potential as contemplated uses,96 and demand
would increase every time a new use was discovered and popular-
ized.97  The result was a continuous circle of innovation and adop-
tion.98  In other words, it was the PC’s flexibility that fostered its
89. See infra Part III.A.1–3.
90. See ZITTRAIN, FUTURE OF THE INTERNET, supra note 18, at 3, 14–15 (describing the R
PC as lacking a set function and being capable of running third party software and explain-
ing that both PCs and the Internet revolutions were launched by these attributes of
openness).
91. Technologies are generative to the extent that they have five qualities: (1) “a capac-
ity for leverage,” (2) “adaptability,” (3) “ease of mastery,” (4) “accessibility,” and (5) “trans-
ferability.” See Zittrain, Generative Internet, supra note 18, at 1981–82 (describing the first R
four qualities); ZITTRAIN, FUTURE OF THE INTERNET, supra note 18, at 73 (adding the fifth R
criterion of transferability, which measures “how easily changes in the technology can be
conveyed to others”).
92. Cf. ZITTRAIN, FUTURE OF THE INTERNET, supra note 18, at 3 (describing the PC and R
Internet revolutions as functions of those technologies’ generative nature, which invited
innovation, and asserting that both technologies overwhelmed their respective nongenera-
tive competitors).
93. Id. at 12.
94. See id. (explaining that “for years after” IBM’s 1969 announcement that it would sell
its computers and software independently, “many large firms continued to rely on custom-
built, externally maintained applications designed for specific purposes”).
95. Id. at 13.
96. Id.
97. See id. at 15 (correlating the PC’s increased popularity with its increased
functionality).
98. As Professor Zittrain explains, “PC makers were selling potential functionality as
much as they were selling actual uses, and many makers considered themselves to be in the
hardware business only.” Id. at 13.  He notes further: “The essence—and genius—of sepa-
rating software creation from hardware construction is that the decoupling enables a com-
puter to be acquired for one purpose and then used to perform new and different tasks
without requiring the equivalent of a visit to the mechanic’s shop.”  Id. at 14.
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widespread adoption as compared to machines specifically dedicated
to one task.99
The same path is open to personal robotics.  Under a one-robot,
one-function scenario, we have to rely on the creativity of the few
firms in a position to design, mass produce, and market each robot.100
We end up with the series of appliances and toys we already see on the
market today.101  Under a multifunction scenario, consumers and
other third parties, including sophisticated entrepreneurs, will help
determine the range of applications.102
According to the openness argument, a market for multifunc-
tional robots will turn out a wider variety of attractive robotic applica-
tions, increasing the likelihood that more people will purchase them.
The result is a perpetual cycle.  The more people purchase robots, the
greater the demand for new applications, which in turn drives more
innovation.
2. Nondiscrimination
That early PCs were multifunctional increased their adoption;
that they were nondiscriminatory encouraged a secondary market for
third party software.103  We could imagine a multifunctional platform
that only runs proprietary software.104  But then we would have to rely
on manufacturers to develop and roll out all new applications.105  We
could also imagine a hybrid model—the iPhone App Store, for in-
stance—where platform owners select software for approval.106  The
99. Id. at 15.
100. Cf. supra note 85 and accompanying text. R
101. Cf., e.g., supra note 85 and accompanying text. R
102. Cf. ZITTRAIN, FUTURE OF THE INTERNET, supra note 18, at 2 (describing how consum- R
ers and entrepreneurs created applications unforeseen by manufacturers that helped spur
sales of the Apple II PC).
103. By “third party software,” I mean software developed by a firm that did not develop
the underlying platform.  This definition does not imply that a robotics platform manufac-
turer cannot write code for its own robot, only that it must also be open to code from other
sources. See generally Lothar Determann, Dangerous Liaisons—Software Combinations as Deriv-
ative Works? Distribution, Installation, and Execution of Linked Programs Under Copyright Law,
Commercial Licenses, and the GPL, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1421, 1425 (2006) (explaining that
companies with established computer platforms may wish to prevent their platform’s use
by third party software, while new market entrants tend to encourage such use in order to
establish their platforms).
104. Cf., e.g., ZITTRAIN, FUTURE OF THE INTERNET, supra note 18, at 12 (explaining that R
the bundling of early IBM hardware with software meant that “any improvements to the
computer’s operation had to happen through a formal process of discussion and negotia-
tion between IBM and the client,” with the result that firms could not easily switch vendors
since doing so would require the new vendor to “redo the entire project from scratch”).
105. See supra text accompanying note 100. R
106. VAN SCHEWICK, supra note 62, at 350. R
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risk, however, is that platform providers will block applications that
compete with their own version of the application or that they intend
to develop in the future.107
An open robotics means a corresponding market for robotics
software right from the beginning.108  Willow Garage is an innovative
robotics startup in Silicon Valley with a commitment to an open
source approach.109  In an effort to jump-start robotics, Willow Garage
developed a personal robot platform called the PR2, complete with a
robot operating system (“ROS”).110  Willow Garage employees were
even able to program a PR2 to bring any one of a selection of beer
from the common refrigerator.111 Willow Garage then gave several
PR2s away to researchers to experiment with and program.112  Within
just months of receiving its free PR2, a lab at the University of Califor-
nia, Berkley wrote code that allowed the robot to fold towels113 and
bundle socks.114
107. As Professor Barbara van Schewick explains,
[U]nder certain conditions network providers may have an incentive to exclude
an application that competes with one of their own applications.  Apple’s behav-
ior toward iPhone applications illustrates this possibility.  Before any application
can be sold in the iPhone App Store, Apple must approve it. . . .  Apple has
rejected several applications for the iPhone, claiming that they duplicated func-
tionality provided by existing Apple applications.
Id. (footnotes omitted). She goes on to note that Apple has also rejected applications it
intended later to develop. Id.
108. Cf. N.V., Helping Hands, supra note 79 (noting that Bill Gates organized a research R
group whose “mission was to create a set of software tools that would allow anyone inter-
ested in robotics . . . to write applications that would work with different kinds of
hardware”).
109. For more information, see About Willow Garage, WILLOW GARAGE, http://www.willow
garage.com/pages/about-us/overview (last visited Mar. 21, 2011). The exact definition of
“open source” software is contested.  David McGowan, Legal Implications of Open-Source
Software, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 241, 242 n.1.  I use it to mean software where the source code
is accessible to third parties for addition and alteration.
110. ROS, WILLOW GARAGE, http://www.willowgarage.com/pages/software/ros-platform
(last visited Mar. 21, 2011).
111. admin, supra note 10. R
112. See Press Release, Willow Garage, supra note 10.  Importantly, software developed R
on the PR2’s ROS can be exported to other robotic platforms. See ROS: Introduction,
ROS.ORG, http://www.ros.org/wiki/ROS/Introduction (last visited Mar. 21, 2011) (ex-
plaining that “the primary goal of ROS is to support code reuse in robotics research and
development”).
113. Carol Ness, Researchers Develop a Robot That Folds Towels, UC BERKELEY NEWS CENTER
(Apr. 2, 2010), http://www.berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2010/04/02_robot%20.
shtml.
114. Laundry Robot Achieves Another Landmark, This Time Pairing Your Socks, BERKELEY EN-
GINEERING (Aug. 24, 2010), http://coe.berkeley.edu/news-center/berkeley-engineering-in-
the-news/laundry-robot-achieves-another-landmark-this-time-pairing-your-socks.
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Sony AIBO, the robotic pet, serves as a cautionary counterexam-
ple.  AIBO began as a closed system that ran only proprietary
software—AIBO-ware—that allowed users to “raise” AIBO over time
and teach it certain voice commands.115  Sony eventually published a
programming code (“R-CODE”) that permitted users to teach the
AIBO new behaviors.116  Users loved R-CODE and quickly bypassed
the controls Sony had in place in order to share AIBO programs with
one another online.117  Many people did so, leading to an entire
AIBO subculture.118
Sony learned of the practice and was not pleased.  The company
sent a cease-and-desist letter to the popular AIBO forum AiboHack,
asking the website to take down the traded code as a copyright viola-
tion.119  Sony arguably never recovered from the resulting consumer
backlash, and it shut down the AIBO line in 2006.120  Prior to this
closure, however, Sony released a programming kit for noncommer-
cial use.121  This kit has since expanded into multiple versions and has
115. Christopher Soghoian, Caveat Venditor: Technologically Protected Subsidized Goods and
the Customers Who Hack Them, 6 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 46, 56 (2007) (describing the
AIBO “add-on software,” which allowed AIBO to learn tricks and assume different person-
ality types, as proprietary).
116. See RICARDO A. TE´LLEZ, R-CODE SDK TUTORIAL 3–4 (Sept. 4, 2004), available at
http://www.ouroboros.org/rcode_tutorial_1v2.pdf (explaining what users could program
AIBO to do using the R-CODE script, which “is a powerful tool that allows the implementa-
tion of real complicated behaviours”).
117. See Peter Rojas & Phillip Torrone, Speak, AIBO, Speak!, POPSCI (July 12, 2004, 11:54
AM), http://popsci.com/gear-gadgets/article/2004-07/speak-aibo-speak (explaining how
AIBO enthusiasts encouraged the shift from Sony’s aibopet.com to the hacker site
aibohack.com, which includes files and instructions about how to reprogram old and new
AIBO models).
118. There are many websites devoted to AIBO.  For some examples, see AIBO-LIFE,
http://www.aibo-life.org (last visited Mar. 21, 2011); AIBOHACK, http://www.aibohack.com
(last visited Mar. 21, 2011); and AIBOWORLD, http://www.aiboworld.com (last visited Mar.
21, 2011).
119. Dave Wilson et al., Sony Dogs Aibo Enthusiast’s Site, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2001, at C1.
120. See Eric A. Taub, For Sony’s Robotic Aibo, It’s the Last Year of the Dog, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
30, 2006, at C4 (describing Sony’s decision to discontinue the AIBO after seven years on
the market in order to “improve its financial position”).
121. Yoshiko Hara, Sony Opens Aibo Software to Spur Robotics R & D, ELECTRONIC ENGINEER-
ING TIMES, May 13, 2002, at 14.   Another example of “opening” comes from the popular
robotic vacuum cleaner Roomba and its progeny.  So many users were “hacking” the device
that iRobot released the stripped-down platform Create for users to experiment with, see
supra note 20, as well as an official Roomba open interface (“ROI”) specification, see R
generally IROBOT CORP., IROBOT ROOMBA SERIAL COMMAND INTERFACE (SCI) SPECIFICA-
TION (2005), available at http://www.irobot.com/images/consumer/hacker/Roomba_
SCI_Spec_Manual.pdf (providing the specifications); see also Roomba Open Interface
(ROI), UVA WISE, http://www.mcs.uvawise.edu/wiki/index.php/Roomba_Open_Inter
face_(ROI) (last visited Mar. 21, 2011) (explaining that the ROI specification was formerly
known as the Serial Command Interface Specification). Today, multiple forums exist for
users to share their creations. See, e.g., Robotic Hacking, ROBOT REVIEWS, http://www.robot
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been picked up by various research institutions around the world.122
AIBO has been an official robot of the popular RoboCup tourna-
ment,123 and Sony continues to hold an international AIBO
conference.124
The widespread availability of robotic platforms capable of run-
ning nonproprietary software is more likely to lead to a global robot
software industry.125  Such an industry could take many forms.  Any-
one could write and share code, or only trusted partners of the plat-
form could be entrusted to do so.  Consumers could buy task-specific
software permanently or rent it for the day.126  Importantly, however,
the purpose of at least some software would be to enable consumer
innovation—that is, to allow consumers to put their robots to new
uses.127
The open nature of the market has several potential advantages.
First, we might get more well-developed software more quickly: Open
source robot software can be released early and improve over time—
an assumption Professor Zittrain calls the “procrastination princi-
ple.”128  Second, we might get more secure software.  To the extent we
reviews.com/chat/viewforum.php?f=4 (last visited Mar. 21, 2011) (providing a discussion
forum centered around iRobot’s Roomba, Scooba, and Create).  There is even a popular
handbook called Hacking Roomba. See KURT, supra note 86. R
122. For example, members of the Carnegie Mellon University Computer Science De-
partment developed Tekkotsu, a software package for robots that “was originally written for
the Sony AIBO.” About Tekkotsu, TEKKOTSU, http://www.Tekkotsu.org/about.html (last vis-
ited Mar. 21, 2011).
123. ROBOCUP, http://www.robocup.org/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2011); see About Our Ro-
bots, UNIV. NEW S. WALES RUNSWIFT, http://cgi.cse.unsw.edu.au/~robocup/2010site/in-
dex.php?p=about (last visited Mar. 21, 2011) (noting use of the AIBO in RoboCups from
1999 to 2008).
124. Anne Hart, Lonely Women Cherish Robot Dogs, EXAMINER.COM (Dec. 5, 2010, 4:54 PM),
http://www.examiner.com/women-s-issues-in-sacramento/lonely-older-women-cherish-
robot-dogs?render=print.
125. Cf. Valentina Vadi, Sapere Aude! Access to Knowledge as a Human Right and a Key
Instrument of Development, 12 INT’L J. COMM. L. & POL’Y 345, 357–58 (2008) (describing the
open source movement and its pragmatic view that nonproprietary software will have eco-
nomic and technical benefits).
126. Some companies have already begun developing business plans centered on rent-
ing out specific software. See Fran Foo, Nivio Offers Monthly Rental on Software, AUSTRALIAN,
July 20, 2010, at 38 (describing one such company).
127. Some humanoid robots, such as Nao already come with simplified programming
tools. See, e.g., Step into the Future Classroom: NAO!, ALDEBARAN ROBOTICS, http://
www.aldebaran-robotics.com/en/naoeducation (last visited Jan. 11, 2011) (boasting a
“user-friendly programming environment[ that] students and teachers can use at any pro-
gramming level”).
128. See ZITTRAIN, FUTURE OF THE INTERNET, supra note 18, at 31 (“The procrastination R
principle rests on the assumption that most problems confronting a network can be solved
later or by others.  It says that the network should not be designed to do anything that can
be taken care of by its users.”).
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are worried about robot security, open source software may be easier
to vet for vulnerabilities.129  This increased security, in turn, could
lead to greater rates of adoption, since consumers and firms will be
less concerned about the risk that their robots will be compromised by
hackers.130
3. Modularity
Another aspect of open robotics is hardware modularity, which is
the ability to swap out or add new parts.131  Open robotic platforms
will be modular in design and in use.132  As Professor Barbara van
Schewick explains, “The goal of modularity [of design] is to create
architectures whose components can be designed independently but
still work together.”133  That is, design modularity seeks to create
products where “users of the product can replace or ‘mix and match’
components at a later stage.”134  Many PCs are modular in this way.135
One example of modular design is the KUKA youBot from Ger-
many,136 a commercially available robot consisting of a motorized
129. Although the claim is subject to debate, many believe open source software is more
secure than closed source software. See, e.g., Tom Espiner, Trend Micro: Open Source Is More
Secure, ZDNET (June 13, 2006, 11:44 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/news/trend-micro-open-
source-is-more-secure/148445 (quoting the chief technical officer of an antivirus vendor as
stating that open source software has security advantages).  There is a distinct concern that
widespread introduction of robotics may also present governments greater opportunities
for control, for example, through surveillance, manipulation, and outright coercion. See,
e.g., Noel Sharkey et al., The Coming Robot Crime Wave, COMPUTER, Aug. 2010, at 116, 116
(describing increased government use of robots for police functions, such as micro-heli-
copters used for surveillance and soon-to-be-armed ground robots for hostage rescue).  But
see LESSIG, supra note 49, at 150–51 (arguing that the power of government is constrained R
when code is open code, which “means open control—there is control, but the user is
aware of it”).  Professor Lessig argues that open software supports the democratic process
by making government regulation more transparent and constrained. See LESSIG, supra
note 49, at 150–52 (contrasting the government’s regulatory power over open and closed R
code).
130. Cf., e.g., Denning et al., supra note 12, at 1 (revealing security vulnerabilities in R
three commercially available home robots).  For a detailed discussion of the privacy issues
robots present, see M. Ryan Calo, Robots & Privacy, in ROBOT ETHICS: THE ETHICAL AND
SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF ROBOTICS (Patrick Lin et al. eds., forthcoming 2011).
131. VAN SCHEWICK, supra note 62, at 38. R
132. See id. at 39 (describing modularity in design and in use). There is a third type of
modularity: modularity in production that refers to the ability to produce components
independently for later assembly. Id.
133. Id. at 38.
134. Id. at 39.
135. Id. at 40.
136. Markus Waibel, Scoop: KUKA’s youBot Mobile Manipulator Unveiled, IEEE SPECTRUM:
AUTOMATON BLOG (June 11, 2010), http://spectrum.ieee.org/automaton/robotics/indus-
trial-robots/scoop-kukas-youbot; see also KUKA, supra note 23. R
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platform, a robotic arm, and a gripper.137  The KUKA youBot has no
predetermined function beyond research and education.138  It runs a
variety of software modules, including multiple operating systems.139
The KUKA youBot is also modular.  Components of KUKA—a new
gripper, for instance—can be switched out.140
Modular robots have several advantages.  First, they can lead to
more innovation by reducing the overall costs of innovating141 and, as
in the context of phones and set-top boxes, by inviting more participa-
tion in the robotics ecosystem.142
Second, they can lead to broader adoption.  In addition to run-
ning any compatible software program, open robots are physically ex-
tensible and hence more versatile.143  Should an independent party
design a new robot component that permits additional functionality—
for instance, a night vision camera—consumers will not have to wait
until the product is purchased or licensed by a robotics manufacturer
and built into the next model.144
There is less of a penalty for adopting modular robots early.  Im-
agine, for example, that some third party company or individual de-
signs a significantly better gripper for a robot, one that permits the
robot to perform a very delicate task it could not perform directly out
137. Waibel, supra note 136. R
138. Id. (noting research and education as the youBot’s primary purpose).
139. Id.
140. Id. (noting that the gripper is detachable).
141. VAN SCHEWICK, supra note 62, at 118–38 (describing three costs of innovation and R
explaining how modularity reduces them).  Modularity may also lessen subsequent devel-
opment error because designers need only understand the module they are working on,
rather than the entire system. Id. at 41.  This could also increase the security and safety of
robots, thereby also affecting adoption.
142. This increased participation could occur in a number of ways.  For instance, con-
sumers could swap out riskier components for new, safer ones. Cf. supra note 129 (describ- R
ing the possible security advantages to open source software).
143. See, e.g., VAN SCHEWICK, supra note 62, at 41 (discussing how modularity allows inde- R
pendent innovators to create new hardware attachments and programs for preexisting PCs
and their operating systems).
144. Robotics Group offers just such a component—a mobile platform with a pre-in-
stalled night vision camera. Robotics Group 4x4 Mobile Platform w/ Night Vision Camera,
ROBOTSHOP, http://www.robotshop.com/robotics-4x4-mobile-platform-night-vision-cam-
era-2.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2011).  Again, I am not suggesting that open robotics be
free of intellectual property constraints.  Indeed, the inability to patent software or hard-
ware would provide a serious disincentive to innovation. See Seth A. Cohen, To Innovate or
Not to Innovate, That Is the Question: The Functions, Failures, and Foibles of the Reward Function
Theory of Patent Law in Relation to Computer Software Platforms, 5 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L.
REV. 1, 19 (1999) (explaining how the patent system can deter innovation by overpro-
tecting innovations).  I am only suggesting that a significant proportion of robotic plat-
forms be open to third party software and hardware, including software and hardware that
is proprietary.
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of the box.145  If the robot is modular, consumers will merely have to
replace the gripper to gain the new functionality.146  If not, they will
have to replace the entire robot with the next version.147
It may be perfectly feasible to replace a cell phone or even a
laptop every year, but replacing personal robots with such frequency
could be much more expensive.148  This increased expense could act
as a disincentive to purchase a robot in the first instance.  Why not
defer such a large investment until robots can do more?  Of course, a
system could arise in which consumers trade, upgrade, or lease robots,
as with vehicles.149  But, such a system seems unlikely to arise out of
nothing and without a robust personal robotics market already in
place.
B. Tradeoffs
Open robotics may pave the way to more rapid innovation and
adoption.  Yet openness is not itself sufficient.  Moreover, a “perfect”
openness is neither attainable nor desirable.  One example of ex-
treme modularity, for instance, might be robotic kits, which permit
users to substitute out nearly any part of their robots.150  Robots built
from kits tend to be very limited in functionality and in their ability to
run software.151
145. See, e.g., Kristina Grifantini, The Year in Robotics, TECH. REV. (Dec. 29, 2009), http://
www.technologyreview.com/computing/24231/?a=f (describing advances in gripping and
grasping technology made during the prior year).
146. Cf. supra note 143. R
147. Modularity permits innovation by parties other than the robot’s platform manufac-
turer. VAN SCHEWICK, supra note 62, at 121 (“[A]utonomous changes can often be realized R
independently by actors other than the system architect.”).  But, it also permits a company
to change its own product. See id. at 120–21 (“Since autonomous changes do not incur any
costs of system adaptation, the threshold for innovation is considerably lower than for sys-
temic changes, making it more likely that the innovation will be realized.”).
148. Cf. Hiroko Tabuchi, Robots Unplugged, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2009, at B1 (discussing
the market failure of several personal robots, in part because of high retail prices).
149. Swisslog, among other companies, has instituted a leasing program for its autono-
mous mobile robots, which are used in hospitals. Swisslog’s Autonomous Mobile Robots Availa-
ble for Lease, PRWEB (May 17, 2010), http://www.prweb.com/releases/2010/05/prweb4001
324.htm.
150. See, e.g., Robotics Kits, MACHINE SCI., http://www.machinescience.org/store/home.
php?cat=249 (last visited Mar. 22, 2010) (selling robotic kits).
151. E.g., GARETH BRANWYN, ABSOLUTE BEGINNER’S GUIDE TO BUILDING ROBOTS 152
(2004) (describing Tab Robotics’ “Build Your Own Robot” kit as “fast and easy to build, but
limited in function”).
Part of the advantage of buying a ready-made robotic platform is that a certain mea-
sure of functionality, including low-level programming routines, is already in place. See,
e.g., WILLOW GARAGE, CALL FOR PROPOSALS: PR2 BETA PROGRAM: A PLATFORM FOR PERSONAL
ROBOTICS 5 (2010), available at http://www.willowgarage.com/sites/default/files/cfp/
CFP2010.pdf (“Researchers and developers can use the existing system as a base, extending
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Moreover, open robotics will not support innovation without a
sufficient degree of standardization, which locks in certain facets of
software and hardware architecture, at least temporarily.152  One ex-
ample is the universal serial bus (“USB”) standard in computing.153
Although this standard facilitates the design and adoption of cameras,
printers, and other peripherals,154 it inhibits, at least temporarily, the
development of another connection standard that might be more effi-
cient.155  Such tradeoffs have been successfully navigated in the con-
text of PCs,156 and they will again need to be navigated in the context
of personal robotics.
The vision, then, is of a handful of popular robotics platforms,
each of which is open to third party programmers and hardware de-
signers.  Robotic platforms will ideally vary in size, expense, durability,
and potential functionality, just as in any other market for consumer
it as needed, and developing new components where appropriate.  To make a rough anal-
ogy, ROS does for robots what Linux does for personal computers: providing a basic system
that is open-source at its core, so that researchers and developers can dig in and change
any part they deem necessary.”).
152. See VAN SCHEWICK, supra note 62, at 43 (explaining how varying degrees of standard- R
ization impact the potential for innovation).  Modularity may also affect the overall per-
formance of the system. Id.
153. See Marshall Brain, How USB Ports Work, HOWSTUFFWORKS, http://
www.howstuffworks.com/usb.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2011) (explaining that nearly all
computers sold today have USB ports, which enable users to connect other devices, such as
a mouse or printer, to their PCs).
154. See id. (“Just about every peripheral made now comes in a USB version.”).
155. This technological inertia is implicit in the idea of standardization. See, e.g., Barry
Fagin, Standardization/Innovation Trade-Offs in Computing: Implications for High-Tech Antitrust
Regulation, KNOWLEDGE, TECH., & POL’Y, Fall 1999, at 80, 85–91 (describing the trade-offs
between standardization and innovation in computing and suggesting that the benefits of
one are inversely related to the other).  But see Erik Harris, Note, Discovery of Portable Elec-
tronic Devices, 61 ALA. L. REV. 193, 223 n.181 (2009) (arguing that standardization led to
innovation in the computer industry because “[w]hen minor players do not need to re-
invent or re-define the standard, they are free to focus on the innovation that gives them a
real competitive edge”).  Of course, there could be multiple standards operating simulta-
neously, each permitting innovation within its own ecosystem.  Such is the case today with
computer operating systems, browser plug-ins, phones, and applications.  For example, de-
velopers may decide to code applications either for the iPhone, Android, or both.  Note
that Android, a more open and versatile system, has eclipsed Apple’s iPhone in sales. See
Lyons, supra note 7 (“Android now has leapt past Apple to become the biggest smart- R
phone platform in the United States, the third-biggest worldwide, and by far the fastest
growing.”); Mike Jennings, Android, Amazon and the Case Against Third-Party App Stores, PC
PRO BLOG (Oct. 19, 2010), http://www.pcpro.co.uk/blogs/2010/10/19/android-amazon-
and-the-case-against-third-party-app-stores (comparing the “open and versatile nature” of
Android with Apple’s “walled garden”).
156. See, e.g., Fagin, supra note 155, at 88–89 (contrasting the adoption of computer R
programming languages that were “significant improvements over existing alternatives”
with the failure of computing languages whose adoption would have required “a large scale
programming language change” that would engender a “huge amount of resource loss”).
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electronics.157  This mimics the present state of personal comput-
ing.158  The key is to ensure that a sufficient number of platforms re-
main open to third party innovation in order to spark a continuous
cycle of creativity and demand.
IV. ROBOTS AS PHYSICAL PCS
Insofar as openness is a catalyst for innovation and adoption,159
we may want to remove major disincentives to openness in the context
of personal robotics.  With respect to computers and the Internet,
such disincentives include platform lock down and various types of
discrimination by firms.160  The same is true of robotics.161  Consum-
ers, scholars, and lawmakers should be wary of closed robotics in all
the same ways, and for all the same reasons, as they might be in other
technologies.
There is, however, an additional disincentive to openness in the
field of personal robotics—one that is not discussed in the cyberlaw
literature on openness and innovation.  Open robotics may expose
robotics platform manufacturers and distributors to legal liability for
accidents in a far wider set of scenarios than closed robotics.162  In-
deed, one or more high profile products liability cases could move
nearly every serious player to a closed model.
That there will be injuries and damage is hardly in doubt.  Hun-
dreds of robot-related accidents, including fatalities, have occurred in
factories and other workplaces.163  A number of very serious accidents
157. In the computer market, for example, compare Dell’s $280 Inspiron Mini 10
Netbook, a ten inch “lightweight mobile network,” Inspiron Mini 10 (1018) Netbook, DELL,
http://www.dell.com/us/p/inspiron-mini1018/pd (last visited Mar. 6, 2011), with Apple’s
$2,000 twenty-seven inch iMac, a desktop computer contained entirely within the display
unit, iMac, APPLE STORE, http://store.apple.com/us/browse/home/shop_mac/family/
imac?mco=MTcyMTgwNTQ (last visited Mar. 6, 2011).
158. See supra note 156 and accompanying text. R
159. See supra Part III.A. But see supra text accompanying note 152 (noting that openness R
alone cannot foster innovation).
160. See, e.g., supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text. R
161. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 115–20. R
162. See infra notes 178–87 and accompanying text. R
163. There is a long history of accidents involving factory robots. See, e.g., Killer Robots:
Coming Soon to a Factory Near You, ECONOMIST, June 27, 1987, at 89 (“In one incident in
1984—a black year in which robots killed four people [in Japan]—a robot under inspec-
tion suddenly moved forward, and ran over its inspector.  In another incident in the same
year, a robot arm swung at a worker, giving him a deadly automated karate chop.”).  In
more recent years, reports of robot-related injuries have begun to surface outside the con-
text of manufacturing. See, e.g., Paul McCann, TV Robot Injures Studio Workers, TIMES
(London), Jan. 8, 2000 (“During filming recently, a 170lb robot came to life after it was
switched off and careened out of control, injuring a stage technician.”).
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have occurred on the battlefield or during military testing.164  Many
efforts are underway to make robots used in the home safer—for in-
stance, by using lighter material to build robots intended to interact
with the general public.165  Despite these efforts, perfect safety is not
likely, a point no one seriously contests.  Moreover, some people may
purposefully use robots to cause damage or injury.166
Liability for damage or injury caused by a personal robot should
be relatively straightforward in a closed world.  The robot is a product
capable of performing one or more specific tasks; if it fails to perform
these tasks, or if it performs them unsafely, the manufacturer could
generally be pursued in court.167  To reduce the risk of liability, the
manufacturer could warn of anticipated dangers, such as electric
164. See, e.g., SINGER, supra note 1, at 38, 125 (describing incidents of dangerous military R
robot malfunctions); Noah Shachtman, Robot Cannon Kills 9, Wounds 14, WIRED DANGER
ROOM (Oct. 18, 2007, 9:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2007/10/robot-can-
non-ki (describing a fatal robot malfunction during a shooting exercise in South Africa).
165. See, e.g., Alan S. Brown, Nimble New Robot Is Safe Around Humans, LIVESCI. (Nov. 2,
2006, 9:57 AM), http://www.livescience.com/technology/061102_human_robot.html
(describing a small and light robot “designed to work next to humans” as so “puny” that a
child could “arm wrestle it to the table”).
166. See Sharkey et al., supra note 129, at 114, 114–15 (exploring how robots might be R
used to commit or facilitate crimes).
167. To oversimplify, products liability law, which can vary from state to state, permits
recovery for physical injury or damages where a product design is unsafe, and the product
is used in a normal and foreseeable manner. See, e.g., Schemel v. Gen. Motors Corp., 384
F.2d 802, 804–05 (7th Cir. 1967) (explaining that a “manufacturer is not an insurer,” but is
subject to liability for physical harm caused by lawful use of a product whose design makes
its probable use dangerous to its intended users), overruled on other grounds by Huff v. White
Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1977); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS.
LIAB. § 1 (1998) (“One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing prod-
ucts who sells or distributes a defective product is subject to liability for harm to persons or
property caused by the defect.”); DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 1 (2005)
(“Products liability law governs liability for the sale or other commercial transfer of a prod-
uct that causes harm because it was defective . . . .”).  The defect must also be the proxi-
mate cause of the injury, which some courts allow a plaintiff to prove by showing that the
defect was a “substantial factor” in causing her injury. See Codling v. Paglia, 298 N.E.2d
622, 628 (N.Y. 1973) (“[U]nder a doctrine of strict products liability, the manufacturer of a
defective product is liable to any person injured or damaged if the defect was a substantial
factor in bringing about his injury or damages . . . .”).
I am assuming that early personal robotics damages claims will be grounded in prod-
ucts liability, just as factory robot cases have been. See, e.g., Jones v. W+M Automation, Inc.,
818 N.Y.S.2d 396, 398 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (products liability action stemming from a
head injury from gantry loading system).  Some actions, however, have been brought as
intentional torts. See, e.g., Miller v. Rubbermaid, Inc., No. CV 2005 10 6197, 2007 WL
1695109, at *2, *4–5  (Ohio Ct. App. June 13, 2007) (considering an intentional tort action
against an employer following the death of a process technician crushed while teaching a
robot due to a malfunction); Pettit v. Clarion Techs., No. WM-04-014, 2005 WL 2048929, at
*1 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2005) (reversing summary judgment for an employer in an
intentional tort action after a maintenance manager suffered severe injuries from a fall
into an injection molding press after malfunction repair).
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shock from submersion in water.168  Because both the hardware and
the software come from the same place, courts will not have to per-
form a complex analysis to determine responsibility.169  Additionally,
no aspect of a closed robot is intended to be modified.170  If it is modi-
fied, then the manufacturer may invoke the alteration as a defense.171
Consider the popular robotic vacuum cleaner Roomba.172  Ac-
cording to a recent news report, a Roomba vacuumed up and killed a
poisonous snake in Israel.173  Imagine that, instead of a snake, the
Roomba had run over and damaged the tail of a household pet.
Roomba has one task: to vacuum the floor.174  The company that
manufactures the Roomba, iRobot, can reasonably anticipate what
168. A warning will generally be considered legally valid if a reasonable consumer could
understand and follow it, thereby avoiding injury. See Harless v. Boyle-Midway Div., Am.
Home Prods., 594 F.2d 1051, 1054 (5th Cir. 1979) (noting that a valid warning label must
“‘reasonably be expected to catch the attention of the reasonably prudent man in the
circumstances of its use’” and must be “‘of such a nature as to be comprehensible to the
average user and to convey a fair indication of the nature and extent of the danger to the
mind of a reasonably prudent person’” (quoting jury instruction with approval)).
169. Under the component part doctrine, for instance, the manufacturer of a nondefec-
tive part would not be liable if the part is incorporated into a defective robotic system. See
Brett W. Roubal, Note, Protecting Suppliers of Safe Component Parts and Raw Materials Through
the Component Part Doctrine and the Sophisticated Purchaser Doctrine: In re Temporomandibular
Joint (TMJ) Implants Products Liability Litigation, 31 CREIGHTON L. REV. 617, 625–26
(1998) (explaining that the component parts doctrine shields manufacturers of “inher-
ently safe component parts” from strict product liability “when their parts are incorporated
into a finished product that the component part manufacturer did not build or design”);
see also W+M Automation, Inc., 818 N.Y.S.2d at 398 (affirming dismissal of claims against
companies that “established as a matter of law that they manufactured only nondefective
component parts”).
170. See supra text accompanying notes 85–86. R
171. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. p (“Product misuse,
modification, and alteration are forms of post-sale conduct by product users or others that
can be relevant to the determination of the issues of defect, causation, or comparative
responsibility.”).  Of course, because normal use includes more than just intended use, man-
ufacturers must foresee some level of carelessness. See, e.g., Reid v. Spadone Mach. Co., 404
A.2d 1094, 1098 (N.H. 1979) (affirming a jury finding of product liability where unsafe
practices were foreseeable because the product design encouraged such practices and ade-
quately warned against those practices), overruled on other grounds by Daigle v. City of Ports-
mouth, 534 A.2d 689 (N.H. 1987).
172. See supra text accompanying note 20.  Surgical robots are another, nonhypothetical R
example of closed robots that have been linked to physical injuries. See John Carreyrou,
Surgical Robot Examined in Injuries, WALL ST. J., May 5, 2010, at A1 (reporting on several
“robotic surgeries” in which injuries occurred).
173. Evan Ackerman, Heroic Israeli Roomba Saves Children from Deadly Viper, BOTJUNKIE
(Nov. 20, 2009, 2:19 PM), http://www.botjunkie.com/2009/11/20/heroic-israeli-roomba-
saves-children-from-deadly-viper.
174. It is, after all, marketed as the “iRobot Roomba Vacuum Cleaning Robot.” See
Cleaning Robots—Vacuum Cleaning, IROBOT, http://store.irobot.com/category/index.jsp?
categoryId=3334619&cp=2804605&ab=CMS_IRBT_Supercat_070109 (last visited Mar. 21,
2011).
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might go wrong and either provide warnings or modify the design.
Should the Roomba’s design lead to an injury due to its normal use,
then iRobot may face liability.175  Should the consumer modify or
“hack” the Roomba to perform a function it was not designed to per-
form—such as reenact the 1980s video game Frogger, in which a frog
crosses a highway during traffic176—then the consumer is arguably re-
sponsible in the event of an accident.177
In an open world, liability could be much harder to determine.
There are problems, for instance, with foreseeability because the man-
ufacturer could not necessarily anticipate the universe of potential
problems that might stem from third party innovation and provide
warnings or modify the platform design in response.178  One might
assume that this difficulty would inure to the manufacturer’s benefit
because defendants will not generally be found strictly liable in tort
where the injury in question was not foreseeable.179  But even for
causes of action that require fault, a defendant need not have fore-
seen the exact mechanism of harm, only the general category.180
175. See supra note 167 and accompanying text. R
176. Some Roomba users actually modified the Roomba in this way. See Daniel
Terdiman, Roomba Takes Frogger to the Asphalt Jungle, CNET NEWS (Mar. 15, 2006, 10:01
AM), http://news.cnet.com/Roomba-takes-Frogger-to-the-asphalt-jungle/2100-1043_3-
6049922.html (describing “Roomba Frogger,” a “tricked-out” version of the robot “dressed
in a cut-up green T-shirt to look like a frog”).
177. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.  Again, liability would turn in part on R
reasonable foreseeability.  In fact, it appears that iRobot was aware of the hacking and
responded by launching another product, the Create, specifically devoted to modification
and reprogramming. See supra note 20. R
178. See Peter M. Asaro, Robots and Responsibility from a Legal Perspective 2 (Jan. 20,
2007) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at http://
www.peterasaro.org/writing/ASARO%20Legal%20Perspective.pdf (“[T]here is a limit to
what robot engineers and designers can do to limit the potential uses and harms caused by
their products because other parties, namely the consumers and users of robots, will
choose to do all sorts of things with them . . . .”).
179. See Curtis E.A. Karnow, Liability for Distributed Artificial Intelligences, 11 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 147, 173–74, 178 (1996) (noting that “causation is a necessary element of any
civil tort lawsuit” and explaining that proximate cause depends upon “reasonable foresee-
ability”); see also Barker v. Lull Eng’g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 455–56 (Cal. 1978) (finding that
for a manufacturer to be held strictly liable for a defective product, either the product
must have “failed to perform safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an
intended or reasonably foreseeable manner,” or its design must have proximately caused the
injury and the manufacturer fails to establish that “the benefits of the challenged design
outweigh the [inherent] risk of danger” (emphasis added)).
180. E.g., Tieder v. Little, 502 So. 2d 923, 926 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (“It is not neces-
sary . . . that the defendant foresee the exact sequence of events which led to the accident
sued upon . . . it must be shown that the said general-type accident was a reasonably fore-
seeable consequence of the defendant’s negligence.”).  As an evolving standard, foresee-
ability will depend on public perception of what robots can do. See Karnow, supra note 179, R
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Some states even shift the burden of proof to the manufacturer-defen-
dant to prove that the harm at issue was not foreseeable.181
There are also potential problems with determining proximate
cause.  It is extremely difficult to discover whether software, as op-
posed to hardware, is responsible for the glitch that led to an acci-
dent.182  If the software is responsible, it would be hard to determine
whether the precise cause was the operating system or the application
(and, if the latter, which application).183  This analysis is all the more
difficult where the software is open source (since no single author is
responsible) and the hardware can be easily modified.
Additionally, in an open world, manufacturers would not necessa-
rily be able to invoke the common defense of product misuse.184  The
open personal robot (like the PC) is not designed to perform prede-
termined tasks.185  Thus, the manufacturer is unlikely to defend itself
successfully by arguing that the consumer used the robot improp-
erly.186  Nor could the manufacturer rely on the fact that the robot’s
platform had been modified, since an open robot is intended to be
at 180 (“What is ‘reasonably foreseeable,’ and so what qualifies as a ‘proximate cause,’
depends on custom and what people generally believe.”).
181. See, e.g., Barker, 573 P.2d at 455 (“[O]nce the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing
that the injury was proximately caused by the product’s design, the burden should appro-
priately shift to the defendant to prove . . . that the product is not defective.”).
182. See Nancy G. Leveson & Clark S. Turner, An Investigation of Therac-25 Accidents, COM-
PUTER, July 1993, at 18, 18 (“Most [computer-related] accidents are system accidents; that
is, they stem from complex interactions between various components and activities.  To
attribute a single cause to an accident is usually a serious mistake.”).
183. Id.  Nor is it possible to debug software completely—that is, to anticipate how it will
behave in all circumstances. See id. at 29 (“Virtually all complex software can be made to
behave in an unexpected fashion under certain conditions.”); id. at 38 (explaining that
one mistake leading to the recurrence of computer-related accidents was “the assumption
that fixing a particular error (eliminating the current software bug) would prevent future
accidents” because “[t]here is always another software bug”); see also Karnow, supra note
179, at 162 (acknowledging that there are “inherent problems with software reliability” and R
that it is “practically impossible to test software thoroughly”).
184. Cf. Yueh-Hsuan Weng et al., The Legal Crisis of Next Generation Robots: On Safety
Intelligence § 2.3 (presented at The ACM 11th Int’l Conf. on Artificial Intelligence and
Law at Stanford Law Sch., June 4–8, 2007), available at http://works.bepress.com/
weng_yueh_hsuan/2 (describing the difficulty of assessing the safety risks posed by robots
with autonomous intelligence that enables them to adapt to complex environments).
185. Cf. Jordan, supra note 32, at 10 (noting that a computer manufacturer might sell R
the equipment without knowing how the user intends to use it).
186. Cf. Lehman-Wilzig, supra note 15, at 448 (“While the inherent risk of a lawn mower R
is clear, not so that of a computer which is capable of a huge number of diverse func-
tions.”).  It is possible that roboticists will eventually be able to avoid strict liability on the
ground that it is patently obvious that open robots are unavoidably unsafe or dangerous in
ordinary use.  Cf. Killeen v. Harmon Grain Prods., Inc., 413 N.E.2d 767, 770 (Mass. App.
Ct. 1980) (“Toothpicks . . . present obvious dangers to users, but they are not unreasonably
dangerous, in part because the very obviousness of the danger puts the user on notice.”).
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modified.  In fact, the capacity to be modified could even support a
finding of liability.187
Of course, all these issues—foreseeability, proximate cause, mis-
use, and so on—also exist with respect to PCs and software.188  But
despite early predictions of strict liability for computers,189 the oppo-
site result was obtained.190  Confronted with the problem of glitch-
ridden, multifunctional computers running third party software,
courts moved quickly to curb the problem by limiting liability on the
ground that computer limitations are obvious.191  Courts also rou-
tinely characterize software as a “good” (rather than a service), as
these terms are defined by the Uniform Commercial Code,192 and in-
voke the economic loss doctrine to limit damages to the terms of the
187. But see Meesler v. Simmons Gun Specialties, Inc., 687 P.2d 121, 125 (Okla. 1984)
(“Liability for injuries sustained by a user of an altered product may be imposed on a
manufacturer or seller if the injuries were caused by a defect in the product as manufac-
tured and sold.  The seller or manufacturer may not be held liable if an alteration is re-
sponsible for the defect, and is the intervening and superseding cause as opposed to the
concurrent cause of the injuries.”).
188. For an argument that software manufacturers should face liability for security-re-
lated software failures, see Kevin R. Pinkney, Putting Blame Where Blame Is Due: Software Man-
ufacturer and Customer Liability for Security-Related Software Failure, 13 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH.
43, 82 (2002) (endorsing a strict tort liability standard for software manufacturers, who
would be able to use a contributory negligence defense against consumers in certain cir-
cumstances).  For an early argument that computer programs are subject to standard prod-
ucts liability law, see Vincent M. Brannigan & Ruth E. Dayhoff, Liability for Personal Injuries
Caused by Defective Medical Computer Programs, 7 AM. J.L. & MED. 123, 144 (1981) (“[C]ourts
will find most medical computer programs to be products subject to strict liability . . . .”).
189. See, e.g., JOHN C. LAUTSCH, AMERICAN STANDARD HANDBOOK OF SOFTWARE BUSINESS
LAW 263–64 (1985) (asserting that computers “will inevitably become a focus of liability”
and arguing that “the true products liability dimensions of software writing [is] starkly
apparent”); L. Nancy Birnbaum, Strict Products Liability and Computer Software, 8 COMPUTER/
L.J. 135, 144 (1988) (arguing that strict liability inevitably will be imposed because defec-
tive software is capable of producing catastrophes); Brannigan & Dayhoff, supra note 188, R
at 144 (expecting courts to treat medical software like ordinary products subject to strict
products liability); David A. Hall, Note, Strict Products Liability and Computer Software: Caveat
Vendor, 4 COMPUTER/L.J. 373, 374–75 (1983) (explaining that, while courts have not ad-
dressed application of products liability to computer programs, increased computer use
makes the issue ripe for adjudication).
190. See, e.g., Donald R. Ballman, Software Tort: Evaluating Software Harm by Duty of Func-
tion and Form, 3 CONN. INS. L.J. 417, 419 (1997) (noting that “under current law, software
manufacturers can significantly limit, if not eliminate any liability for damage which errors
in their products create”).
191. See, e.g., Transp. Corp. of Am. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 30 F.3d 953, 960 (8th Cir.
1994) (barring tort recovery under the economic loss doctrine for lost data following failed
disc drive and noting that “[p]otential failure of the disk drive was contemplated by the
parties”).
192. Michael D. Scott, Tort Liability for Vendors of Insecure Software: Has the Time Finally
Come?, 67 MD. L. REV. 425, 435–36 & nn.69–72 (2008).
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sales contract in the event of a malfunction.193  These same courts
steadfastly uphold broad warranty disclaimers, concluding that the
software is not warranted for any particular purpose, even when it was
clearly designed for one, such as word processing.194
The upshot is that you cannot sue Microsoft or Dell because
Word froze and you lost your term paper.  Today, most people would
not even think to do so.  Early adverse case law, coupled with a gen-
eral understanding that computers and software are imperfect, ap-
pears to have created a presumption against holding computer or
software companies responsible for the perils of personal
computing.195
Such expedients to limit liability are only possible with respect to
computers and software, however, to the extent that they do not cause
physical injury.196  The economic loss doctrine, for instance, expressly
confines itself to situations where no corporeal injury has resulted.197
Other product doctrines are similarly limited.  As Michael Scott
explains,
A majority of courts hold that where a contract between
a buyer and seller exists, a negligence claim is unavailable
and the aggrieved party is limited to a breach of contract
claim.
 . . .
 . . .
The only exception to this rule is where the negligent conduct
has caused physical damage to persons, property, or other tangible
things (other than economic loss).198
Where software or computer glitches lead to physical damage or
injury, lawsuits can and do gain traction.199  For instance, in an early
193. Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, The Tort of Negligent Enablement of Cyber-
crime, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1553, 1580 (2005).
194. Id. at 1562–66 (discussing the “broad enforceability” of one-sided software agree-
ments imposed by software manufacturer-licensors disclaiming warranties and limiting lia-
bility); Scott, supra note 192, at 437 (“No reported decision has unequivocally held that a R
software vendor has breached an express warranty.”).
195. See Jordan, supra note 32, at 4, 6, 8 (explaining that computer fallibility is well R
recognized by the public as to protect manufacturers against certain liability claims).
196. See Ballman, supra note 190, at 427–28 (explaining that “the UCC’s ‘unconsciona- R
bility’ doctrine prevents the software manufacturer from evading liability in cases where
personal injury occurs,” but that “economic or property damage is virtually exempt”).
197. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 193, at 1580. R
198. Scott, supra note 192, at 456–57 (emphasis added). R
199. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 193, at 1578 (“Courts have had little difficulty ex- R
tending product liability for bad software when the design defect causes physical injury or
death.”).
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case often cited in the context of software liability, the court entered
judgment against a manufacturer of faulty navigational charts.200  Al-
though the suit was based entirely on faulty information, a physical
accident had ultimately resulted.201  Lawsuits have also proceeded
against producers of computers and software that deliver radiation in
medical testing202 or control the fuel-delivery systems of vehicles.203
In such cases, the computer and software were paradigmatically
closed.  They were built or assembled by one entity and dedicated to a
particular, known task.  One system was supposed to deliver a safe
amount of radiation and failed to do so.204  Another was designed to
control a vehicle’s fuel-delivery system.205  The plaintiffs were not in a
position to modify the software, and in any case, it is unlikely that they
attempted to do so.
Open personal robots represent, arguably for the first time, the
combination of a quality of openness with the capacity to do physical
harm.  How consumers and courts will react to an accident involving a
personal robot is unknown.  Norms tolerating unpredictability may
not transfer to the context where computers become physical.  In the
event of a lawsuit, defendants and jurists will not be able to invoke the
economic loss doctrine—or any other existing doctrine that limits lia-
bility to contract—because the harm at issue is physical.
It is also necessary to consider the optics.  Many Americans may
be uncomfortable or uncertain about robots and wary of robot
proliferation in their lives.206  Meanwhile, early adopters of robots are
likely to include the elderly, the disabled, and others in need of home
200. Halstead v. United States, 535 F. Supp. 782 (D. Conn. 1982), aff’d sub nom.
Saloomey v. Jeppesen & Co., 707 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1983).
201. Id. at 784–85, 790–91 (describing a plane crash resulting in three deaths).
202. See Leveson & Turner, supra note 182, at 21–35 (discussing various lawsuits related R
to the malfunction of Therac-25 medical radiation machines).
203. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Johnston, 592 So. 2d 1054, 1055–56 (Ala. 1992) (describ-
ing the plaintiff’s argument that a defective fuel-delivery system caused his vehicle to stall,
resulting in the death of his grandson).
204. Cf. Leveson & Turner, supra note 182, at 18 (referencing “software-related acci- R
dents” caused by the Therac-25, a computerized radiation therapy machine).
205. Johnston, 592 So. 2d at 1056.
206. See, e.g., Christoph Bartneck, Killing a Robot, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE WORKSHOP ON
MISUSE AND ABUSE OF INTERACTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 2 (2006), available at http://www.
bartneck.de/publications/2006/killingARobot/bartneckAbuseCHI2006.pdf (“Humans
might feel uncomfortable with robots that become undistinguishable from humans.”).
This is reflected in the countless books and movies about machines establishing themselves
over humans as the dominant “species.” See, e.g., THE MATRIX (Warner Bros. 1999) (depict-
ing a future in which robots have imprisoned humans to be used as energy sources).
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assistance207—individuals who make understandably sympathetic
plaintiffs.208  Because robots are expensive and require significant in-
vestment to design, build, and distribute, robot platform manufactur-
ers, if not secondary participants such as software programmers and
hardware designers, are likely to have deep pockets.209
This combination of factors—uncertain liability and norms cou-
pled with sympathetic plaintiffs and well-capitalized defendants—
could act as a significant disincentive to investment in the robotics
market.  Where firms do enter the robotics market, the inability to
predict legal liability becomes an incentive to build limited robots
with controlled parameters, proprietary software, and parts that are
not intended to be modified.  In short, the possibility that robot man-
ufacturers or distributors will be hauled into court every time one of
their robots causes an injury—regardless of what software it was run-
ning, what the consumer was doing, or whether it had been modi-
fied—may lead many potential investors to avoid the industry or to
approach the construction of robots only with great caution.
V. THE CASE FOR SELECTIVE IMMUNITY
I have argued that a sufficiently open robotics market may be the
best way to foster innovation and adoption.210  I have also explored
why open robots face an additional hurdle involving legal liability
that, for various reasons, open computers and closed robots generally
do not.211  This Part begins a conversation about how to avoid disin-
centives to open robotics while preserving incentives for safety.  I ad-
vance a two-step proposal for the short term.  First, we should consider
immunizing manufacturers of open robotic platforms from lawsuits
207. Cf., e.g., ROADMAP FOR U.S. ROBOTICS, supra note 39, at 29–30 (asserting the poten- R
tial of “[s]ocially assistive robots” to enhance quality of life for “the elderly, individuals with
cognitive impairments, those rehabilitating from stroke and other neuromotor disabilities,
and children with socio-developmental disorders such as autism”).
208. Cf., e.g., Amber E. Dean, Lead Paint Public Entity Lawsuits: Has the Broad Stroke of
Tobacco and Firearms Litigation Painted a Troubling Picture for Lead Paint Manufacturers?, 28
PEPP. L. REV. 915, 934 (2001) (noting that lead paint suits are compelling to some plain-
tiffs’ attorneys because “the victim . . . is typically a small child who is poisoned merely by
sucking his thumb”); Yxta Maya Murray, Note, Employer Liability After Johnson Controls: A
No-Fault Solution, 45 STAN. L. REV. 453, 462 (1993) (describing the development of a “mar-
ket share” theory of liability in California courts as a way to find in favor of “highly sympa-
thetic” plaintiffs).
209. See, e.g., Press Release, iRobot, iRobot Reports Third-Quarter Financial Results, In-
creases Full-Year Expectations (Oct. 27, 2010), http://investor.irobot.com/phoenix.zhtml?
c=193096&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1488073&highlight= (announcing third-quarter reve-
nue of $94.2 million, a twenty percent increase since the previous year’s third quarter).
210. See supra Part III.
211. See supra Part IV.
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arising out of users’ changes to robots, at least temporarily.212  Sec-
ond, we should consider whether robot owners can carry insurance
against the possibility of accidents.213
A. Immunity
Robotics is already flourishing in several contexts.  For instance,
there is extensive adoption of robotics in industrial manufacturing.214
Manufacturers of industrial robots are not shielded from liability,215
but because industrial robots are paradigmatically closed in the sense
I have discussed, arguments for and against recovery are fairly straight-
forward.  Moreover, to the extent operation of a nondefective robot
by the end-user or her employer leads to injury, state workers’ com-
pensation regimes will tend to limit employer liability and may avoid
the need to address difficult issues of causation or foreseeability.216  In
addition, robotics is widely deployed in warfare.217 Some battlefield
robots are admittedly open; however, liability tends not to be an issue.
Government contractors are shielded from lawsuits for robot use and
malfunction because they must follow very detailed specifications.218
Assuming the expansion of robotics to be a positive develop-
ment—and some may consider this characterization to be a big as-
sumption—we should investigate how we might grant immunity to
212. See infra Part V.A.
213. See infra Part V.B.
214. See SINGER, supra note 1, at 8 (“[A]ssembly-line factory robotics is an $8 billion a R
year industry, growing at a 39 percent pace in the United States.”).
215. See supra notes 167–68 and accompanying text; cf. Reid v. Spadone Mach. Co., 404 R
A.2d 1094, 1098 (N.H. 1979) (noting that the evidence at trial was sufficient to find that a
cutting machine was defectively designed), overruled on other grounds by Daigle v. City of
Portsmouth, 534 A.2d 689 (N.H. 1987).
216. Cf. William A. Dreier, Beyond Workers’ Compensation: Workplace Comparative Fault and
Third-Party Claims, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 459, 459 (2003) (“With few exceptions, workers’
compensation bars suits against employers and co-workers, but not against third parties
who, through their negligence or the operation of defective products, may have contrib-
uted to an employee’s injury.” (footnote omitted)).
217. See SINGER, supra note 1, at 32 (noting that by 2006 the United States’ invasion of R
Iraq included 5,000 robots and describing projections that there would be as many as
12,000 robots by 2008).
218. See Hunt v. Blasius, 384 N.E.2d 368, 371 (Ill. 1978) (“An independent [govern-
ment] contractor owes no duty to third persons to judge the plans, specifications or in-
structions which he has merely contracted to follow. . . .  [This is so] unless they are so
obviously dangerous that no competent contractor would follow them.”); Robotic Arms with
Controllers, FEDBIZOPPS.GOV (Aug. 23, 2010, 4:22 PM), https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=op-
portunity&mode=form&id=f9247888bf9a357ae78272f89940f332&tab=core&tabmode=
list&= (soliciting robotic arms and controllers and providing an example of detailed speci-
fications that government contractors must meet).
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open platform manufacturers.219  What would immunity for personal
robotics manufacturers look like?  One option is blanket immunity for
all robot manufacturers.  Faced with the bankruptcy of the general
aviation industry, Congress intervened by immunizing small plane and
small plane part manufacturers from lawsuits for a period of eighteen
years.220  The General Aviation Revitalization Act (“GARA”) effectively
transformed general aviation into a caveat emptor market and permit-
ted the industry to reemerge.221
The problem with blanket immunity in the context of robotics is
that it would remove not only the legal disincentive to the production
of open robots but also an incentive to make them safe.  A leading
rationale underlying products liability is to incentivize manufacturers
to improve their product safety,222 although the empirical truth of this
assumption remains to be adequately proven.223
219. A hesitance to build open robots may slow the industry down.  It may also lead to
excessive limitations on end-user behavior that fall short of what is optimal for society. Cf.
Hamdani, supra note 66, at 916–18 (arguing that because the incentives facing Internet R
service providers diverge from those facing their users, subjecting providers to strict liabil-
ity for what users do would lead to excessive censorship of user activity).  Hamdani points
out that “[w]hile [Internet service providers] possess the technical ability to prevent user
misconduct, they do not capture the full value of the conduct they are entrusted with
policing,” which leads to overly restrictive enforcement behaviors. Id. at 956.  This same
result is obtained with open robotic platforms because it is the user, not the roboticist, who
derives value from robot use.
220. See General Aviation Revitalization Act (“GARA”) of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-298,
§ 2(a), 108 Stat. 1552, 1552 (1994) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 notes (2006)) (immuniz-
ing from civil action manufacturers of aircrafts and aircraft components for a period of
eighteen years, subject to certain exceptions); see also Scott David Smith, Note, The General
Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994: The Initial Necessity for, Outright Success of, and Continued
Need for the Act to Maintain American General Aviation Predominance Throughout the World, 34
OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 75, 108–10 (2009) (explaining that the “devastating effects products-
liability law had exacted on the [general aviation] industry” led Congress to enact GARA).
221. See Smith, supra note 220, at 110–11 (noting that “[s]ince GARA’s passage, there R
has been a significant turnaround in the [general aviation] market,” and providing a statis-
tical evaluation of GARA’s success).
222. In other words, the assumption is that the manufacturer will improve product
safety to avoid liability. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. a (1998)
(“The emphasis [on products liability law] is on creating incentives for manufacturers to
achieve optimal levels of safety in designing and marketing products.”); Pinkney, supra
note 188, at 70 (“[S]oftware manufacturers facing strict liability will efficiently adjust every R
aspect of their behavior.”). Recognition of this effect dates back to at least 1947, when
Judge Learned Hand devised his famous formula for negligence: B < PL. See United States
v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (L. Hand, J.) (“[L]iability depends
upon whether [the burden of adequate precautions] is less than [the gravity of the result-
ing injury] multiplied by [the probability of injury] . . . .”).
223. Compare A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Uneasy Case for Product Liability,
123 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1458–59 (2010) (concluding that “a skeptical attitude about the
effect of product liability on product safety for widely sold products is warranted”), with
John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Easy Case for Products Liability Law: A
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Certainly, there are incentives other than judicially imposed lia-
bility that could make robots safer, including government regulation
and the manufacturer’s desire to attract consumers, to avoid public
derision, and generally to do the right or moral thing.224  But the pos-
sibility of a long trial followed by a costly decision or settlement clearly
weighs in the calculus.225  Moreover, as a normative matter, we do not
want manufacturers to hide behind blanket immunity for inherently
unsafe or carelessly designed platforms.
I propose a more narrow intervention—one closer to the immu-
nity enjoyed by firearms manufacturers226 and website operators.227
For a time, lawsuits on the basis of what individuals did with guns
(namely, shoot one another) posed a serious threat to the firearms
industry.228  It did not matter whether these suits were successful on
the merits (many might not have been); it mattered only that the in-
dustry kept confronting them, thus incurring substantial litigation and
public relations costs.229  Congress perceived the need to intervene,
and in 2005 Congress passed the Protection of Lawful Commerce in
Response to Professors Polinsky and Shavell, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1919, 1927–34 (2010) (criticiz-
ing the empirical basis for Polinsky and Shavell’s skepticism about the ability of tort liability
to deter product dangerousness).
224. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 223, at 1443–52 (discussing the impact of market R
forces and government regulation on safety incentives).
225. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 223, at 1930–31 (suggesting, in response to R
Polinsky and Shavell’s supposed assertion to the contrary, that there is reason to believe
that government regulation, market forces, and the tort system are not independent fac-
tors, but actually influence each other). But see Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 223, at 1454 R
(“Even though product liability might lower a product risk in the absence of market forces
and regulation, it will turn out to be superfluous if a desirable safety precaution has already
been taken because of these two factors.”).
226. See PLCAA, 15 U.S.C. § 7901(b)(1) (2006) (noting that one of the statute’s pur-
poses is “[t]o prohibit causes of action against manufacturers, distributors, dealers, and
importers of firearms . . . for the harm solely caused by the criminal or unlawful misuse of
firearms products . . . by others when the product functioned as designed and intended”).
227. See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text. R
228. See, e.g., David B. Kopel, Protecting Makers of Weapons Boosts Democracy, Rights, SECOND
AMENDMENT PROJECT (Aug. 30, 2001), http://www.davidkopel.com/2A/Lawsuits/Merrillv-
Navegar.htm (“Navegar is merely the latest firearms company to be driven out of business
by abusive lawsuits.”).
229. See id. (“Companies are being destroyed not by jury verdicts, but by litigation
expenses.”).
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Arms Act,230 which generally immunizes gun makers and distributors
from lawsuits for what people do with guns.231
Personal robotics technology has the potential to be far more
beneficial and transformative than personal firearms technology.
Similar to firearms, however, personal robots have a potential to be
misused, to cause injury, and to generate public outcry.232  To pre-
empt a clampdown on robot functionality, Congress should consider
immunizing manufacturers of open robotic platforms from lawsuits
for the repercussions of leaving robots open.233
Specifically, consumers and other injured parties should not be
able to sue roboticists, much less recover damages, where the injury
resulted from one of the following: (1) the use to which the consumer
decided to put the robot, no matter how tame or mundane; (2) the
nonproprietary software the consumer decided to run on the robot;
or (3) the consumer’s decision to alter the robot physically by adding
or changing hardware.  This immunity would include lawful and un-
lawful uses of the robot.  For example, should a consumer run third
party “yard work” software that causes the robot to break a neighbor’s
fence, neither the consumer nor his neighbor would be able to sue
the robot’s manufacturer.  Consider the application on immunity to
an unlawful use of the robot, such as the robotic equivalent of a spring
gun.234  The mere fact that a robot is capable of being modified
through the addition of a weapon or programmed to use lethal force
should not by itself form the basis of a pleading or complaint against
the manufacturer.
230. Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, Pub. L. No. 109-92, 119 Stat. 2095
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901–03); see PLCAA, 15 U.S.C. § 7901(a)(3), (6) (recognizing
that “[l]awsuits have been commenced against manufacturers, distributors, dealers, and
importers of firearms that operate as designed and intended, which seek money damages
and other relief for the harm caused by the misuse of firearms by third parties, including
criminals” and explaining that imposing liability on the firearm industry for harm caused
solely by third parties is, among other things, an “unreasonable burden on interstate and
foreign commerce”).
231. PLCAA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7902–03 (prohibiting federal and state civil actions against
firearm and ammunition manufacturers and sellers “resulting from the criminal or unlaw-
ful misuse” of “qualified product[s]” as defined by the statute).
232. See supra note 166 and accompanying text. R
233. It may prove difficult to determine exactly what constitutes an “open robotic plat-
form” entitled to immunity.  We could use the qualities detailed in Part III as touchstones,
such that completely open platforms would clearly be included.  The exact contours of
immunity, however, are best reserved for future work.
234. In Katko v. Briney, the defendants rigged a shotgun to fire when someone opened
the door to the bedroom of their farmhouse.  183 N.W.2d 657, 658 (Iowa 1971).  The
plaintiff, who prevailed, was a trespasser whose foot was blown off as a result. Id. at 658,
662.  We can imagine a similar scenario involving a robot set to attack an intruder.
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This basic strategy has a track record of success in fostering inno-
vation.  An analogous intervention in favor of website providers argua-
bly made the contemporary Internet possible.  Early in the
development of the commercial web, it was unclear whether websites
would be held liable for user postings.  Most notably, a New York
court concluded that the online service Prodigy could be held liable
as a publisher for defamation taking place on its electronic bulletin
boards.235  Congress intervened by passing Section 230 of the Com-
munications Decency Act of 1996,236 which immunizes websites for
user postings by providing that websites cannot be considered the
publishers of third party content.237
Section 230, along with a similar—albeit more limited—safe har-
bor for copyright infringement,238 has operated to prevent a wide vari-
ety of lawsuits for users’ activities on websites.239  This restriction on
litigation has permitted social networks, video-sharing sites, and other
services to flourish, despite an enormous volume of traffic and unpre-
dictable user behavior.240  In the absence of such immunity, start-ups
and investors might have hesitated to create open communications
platforms out of fear that they would be held liable for unlawful con-
duct taking place on the website.241  Notably, the United States was
the first jurisdiction to put intermediary liability in place, and Ameri-
can companies continue to dominate the Internet field.242
235. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710, at *4–5 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. May 24, 1995), superseded by statute, CDA, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (1996), as recognized in Gucci
Am., Inc. v. Hall & Assocs., 135 F. Supp. 2d 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
236. Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 509, 110 Stat. 133,
137–39 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 230).
237. See supra note 38. R
238. See supra note 38. R
239. See, e.g., Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1120–21 (9th Cir. 2003)
(finding a “computer match making service” to be statutorily immune from liability for
“false content in a dating profile provided by someone posing as another person,” pursu-
ant to § 230(c)(1)); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 328 (4th Cir. 1997) (affirming
§ 230 immunity of interactive computer service provider alleged to have “unreasonably
delayed in removing defamatory messages posted by an unidentified third party, refused to
post retractions of those messages, and failed to screen for similar postings thereafter”).
240. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 70, at 60 (asserting that the enactment of § 230 was a R
“great (non)regulatory decision” in that it “correlates with the beginning of the dot com
boom”).
241. Cf. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 (noting the importance of § 230 to “freedom of speech in
the new and burgeoning Internet medium” and explaining that Congress enacted its im-
munity provisions in part “to maintain the robust nature of Internet communication”).
242. See Goldman, supra note 70, at 60 (suggesting that the status of the United States as R
a global leader in user-generated content, entrepreneurial activity, and innovation owes
much to § 230).
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The immunity I propose is selective: Manufacturers of open ro-
bots would not escape liability altogether.  For instance, if the con-
sumer runs the manufacturer’s software and the hardware remains
unmodified, or if it can be shown that the damage at issue was caused
entirely by negligent platform design, then recovery should be possi-
ble.243  The immunity I propose only applies in those instances where
it is clear that the robot was under the control of the consumer, a
third party software, or otherwise the result of end-user modification.
Because this issue will not always be easy to prove,244 we should expect
litigation at the margins.  I am thus arguing for a compromise posi-
tion: A presumption against suit unless the plaintiff can show the
problem was clearly related to the platform’s design.
Perhaps legal intervention is also necessary with respect to third
party robot software.  Software companies could argue that they, no
less than roboticists, would face disincentives to create and market
software in the face of liability for anything that subsequently goes
wrong.245  After all, it may be very hard to determine whether it was a
particular piece of software—as opposed to another piece of software,
or the software’s interaction with hardware or other software—that
caused the problem.246  And because of the risk of physical injury,
robot software companies may not be able to hide behind simple war-
ranties as have computer software companies.247
Nevertheless, I do not believe that immunity from lawsuit is nec-
essarily appropriate for robotic software.  Nearly any industry would
benefit if it did not have to worry about litigation,248 but there are key
243. The proposed immunity would operate similarly to the waning defense of contribu-
tory negligence in tort, which prevents the plaintiff from recovering if he contributed to
the harm.  For a discussion of the origins of and policy underlying the contributory negli-
gence doctrine, see James McMillan, Contributory Negligence and Statutory Damage Limits—an
Old Alternative to a Contemporary Movement?, 42 IDAHO L. REV. 269, 274–77 (2005).  Sug-
gesting that one of the biggest problems with the contributory negligence doctrine was its
failure to account for cases of simultaneous negligence, McMillan argues that “in cases of
‘sequential’ negligence, contributory negligence is a perfectly defensible doctrine.” Id. at
298–99.
244. See supra Part IV.
245. See Scott, supra note 192, at 469 (“Opponents of strict liability for software vulnera- R
bilities argue that the specter of potentially massive damage awards would inhibit innova-
tion and cause vendors to avoid developing products in these areas.”).
246. See supra note 183 and accompanying text. R
247. See supra text accompanying note 194–95. R
248. Sometimes courts or lawmakers grant immunity merely to incentivize a needed
product.  The government uses immunity, for instance, as an incentive for drug makers to
develop vaccines, see SUSAN THAUL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31793, VACCINE POLICY IS-
SUES 10 (2005) (listing several legislative enactments granting immunity to manufacturers
in order to incentivize vaccines production), which are generally less profitable than other
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differences between software and open platforms.  Immunity for
roboticists encourages an open robotics ecosystem, which benefits eve-
ryone, including software companies.249  Moreover, whereas open
robotics platforms are designed to provide third parties freedom of
use,250 to the extent that software is made for a particular purpose
(despite warranties to the contrary), software developers are in a bet-
ter position to anticipate the uses to which their product will be
put.251  Indeed, many commentators argue that the computer
software industry is mature enough for software developers to face lia-
bility for accidents.252
Finally, we may want to revisit immunity for manufacturers of
open robots if personal robotics flourishes as hoped.  The widespread
proliferation of personal robots—with the resulting opportunities for
observation and research—may lead to a better understanding of
their capacity for harm.  We may even arrive at industry standards that
would provide guidance to courts, consumers, and future roboti-
drugs, see David Brown, Severe Vaccine Shortages Termed “Unprecedented,” WASH. POST, Apr. 20,
2002, at A1.
249. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 108–11. R
250. See supra text accompanying notes 89–92. R
251. Of course, this outcome is not always the case.  While some software might be de-
signed to allow the consumer to program her robot more easily; other software might be
intentionally autonomous and unpredictable.  As Curtis Karnow acknowledges, situations
like these make for very difficult cases:
The legal system thinks it knows how to handle unpredictable systems.
However, some systems may be designed to be unpredictable. . . .  “Fixing”
these unpredictable systems to operate predictably will eviscerate and render
them useless.
Under these circumstances, the law may hesitate to make a simple assign-
ment of responsibility.
Karnow, supra note 179, at 153–54. R
252. See, e.g., Rustad & Koenig, supra note 193, at 1570 (arguing that software vendors R
should be liable for damages resulting from foreseeable cybercrimes due to negligent de-
sign or inadequate software security); Scott, supra note 192, at 462 (arguing that the R
software industry, which employs “highly trained and skilled programmers” whose “pro-
gramming is routinized, scrutinized, and supervised by experienced software development
managers,” has matured to such an extent that it would be reasonable to hold software
vendors liable for product defects); Frances E. Zollers et al., No More Soft Landings for
Software: Liability for Defects in an Industry That Has Come of Age, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 745, 746 (2005) (“[The software industry] has matured to become a domi-
nant sector of the economy.  Consequently, it is appropriate to consider liability for defec-
tive software in the same light as liability for defective automobiles, pharmaceuticals, and
other products.”).  The aesthetics are also different.  Regardless of who or what is responsi-
ble for, say, a collision between a robot and a person in a grocery store, the headline is
nonetheless likely to add a more ominous spin: “Robot crashes into man at grocery store.”
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cists.253  We may not get to this point at all, however, in the absence of
legal intervention.254
B. Insurance
If manufacturers and distributors of open robotic platforms are
granted immunity for claims arising from user modifications, third
party software, and user programming decisions, and if software com-
panies find a way to contract liability away,255 then liability may fall on
users.  Robots may be expensive, but users will likely have limited re-
sources.  Indeed, the spectacle of uncompensated victims of robot ac-
cidents might be just as chilling on the development and use of open
robotics as the threat of liability itself.256  As such, it is worthwhile to
explore other ways to compensate victims in the near term.
One option is to encourage or require insurance.  Should we fol-
low this route, I propose consideration of several factors relevant to
the need for insurance and the amount of insurance coverage.  First,
the level of insurance should depend on the nature of the robot being
insured.  Many robots—for instance, small robots used primarily for
entertainment—would only need to be insured minimally, if at all.257
Larger robots with more autonomous functioning—for instance, se-
253. Standards eventually evolved for industrial and manufacturing robots. See Christo-
pher Harper & Gurvinder Virk, Towards the Development of International Safety Standards for
Human Robot Interaction, 2 INT’L J. SOCIAL ROBOTICS 229, 231–32 (2010), available at http://
www.springerlink.com/content/k6r222j243303912/ (reviewing revisions in safety stan-
dards for robots in manufacturing). Such standards will be harder to implement with re-
spect to personal robots to the extent that the latter is more open, but doing so will not be
impossible. See id. at 232–33 (discussing developing standards for nonmedical personal
care robots).  Indeed, Japan is in the process of developing personal robotics standards,
due for public release in 2012. See Martyn Williams, Panasonic Robot Gives 16-Finger, Auto-
mated Hair Washing, COMPUTERWORLD (Sept. 24, 2010, 3:05 PM), http://news.idg.no/cw/
art.cfm?id=44564365-1A64-6A71-CE11BC59B7A67A80 (predicting that guidelines on the
issues of safety standards and liability laws for robots “could be published in Japan as early
as 2012”).
254. A presumption against liability for open robots may also have a signaling function,
such that people would come to understand that robots are unpredictable and imperfect.
See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2025 (1996)
(discussing the symbolic content of law and arguing that “the expressive function of law
makes most sense in connection with efforts to change norms and that if legal statements
produce bad consequences, they should not be enacted even if they seem reasonable or
noble”).  Were we to open up the possibility of litigation with this assumption in place,
perhaps it would filter out the early plaintiffs’ weaker claims.
255. See supra note 194 and accompanying text. R
256. Cf. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 223, at 1443–50 (discussing market-driven incen- R
tives for manufacturers to avoid product risk, such as when consumers avoid unsafe prod-
ucts or pay less for them).
257. Some level of insurance, however small, for any machine properly characterized as
a home robot would probably be prudent, at least initially.  Even very small robots could
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curity robots that patrol a parking lot—would require greater cover-
age.  Indeed, researchers have already begun to classify robots for
insurance purposes according to their general capacity to cause dam-
age.258  This capacity turns on a number of ascertainable factors, such
as the robot’s mobility, strength, autonomy, and ability to exert con-
trol over its environment.259
Second, we should consider the uses to which the consumer an-
ticipates putting the robot.  Users who use robots for relatively danger-
ous activities, such as house perimeter security, should probably
purchase substantial insurance coverage, whereas those who purchase
robots largely for a sense of companionship need take out less cover-
age, if any.  Other factors could include the presence of children or
pets in the house or the overall likelihood that the robot will come
into contact with strangers.
Any insurance system would no doubt have its flaws.  One chal-
lenge to personal robot insurance in the context of open robotics, for
instance, is that open robots are always changing.260  A user could ini-
tially buy minimal insurance only to later purchase a dangerous hard-
ware module requiring a higher level of insurance, without making
the necessary insurance adjustment.  Purchase of new software could
have a similar effect, with new software rendering a seemingly innocu-
ous robot quite dangerous, or vice versa.
Perfection, however, is not necessarily the goal.261  Despite the
inevitability of some injury and damage, there is little reason to as-
sume that personal robots will regularly harm people or property.  Af-
ter all, commercially available robotic platforms, as well as those
under development, have built-in safety features and, in any event,
generally lack the capacity for devastation.262  That being so, it should
cause injury and trigger a stifling legal response. Cf., e.g., supra text accompanying notes
176–77. R
258. See Anniina Huttunen et al., Liberating Intelligent Machines with Financial Instru-
ments 5–7 (July 1, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=1633460 (classifying intelligent machines into different “risk-categories”).
259. Id. at 6–7.
260. See supra Part III.A.
261. An exhaustive discussion of how best to structure robot insurance is outside the
scope of this Article.  This part simply presents some preliminary thoughts on the issue in
case we decide as a society to head in this direction.
262. See Robotics Indus. Assoc., RIA Conference to Introduce New Robot Safety Standard Draft,
ROBOTICS ONLINE (July 13, 2010), http://www.robotics.org/content-detail.cfm/Industrial-
Robotics-News/RIA-Conference-to-Introduce-New-Robot-Safety-Standard-Draft/con-
tent_id/2261 (discussing new and practical safety topics to be covered by the “in-depth”
industry conference).  For example, popular robots such as WowWee’s Rovio and iRobot’s
Roomba, currently available for the home, remain low to the ground and only weigh a few
pounds. See Rovio, WOWWEE, http://www.wowwee.com/en/support/rovio (last visited
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not be difficult to categorize robotic platforms to a sufficient degree
to ensure that early victims will be compensated for their injuries.
VI. CONCLUSION
Robotics could be the next transformative technology.  Whether
personal robotics will realize its full potential, however, turns on the
degree to which robotics is open to third party innovation.  There are
several obstacles to openness, many of which are explored elsewhere
in cyberlaw.  But open robotics faces another, somewhat novel threat:
the potential for crippling litigation that cannot be guarded against
without dramatically limiting robotic functionality.
I have suggested that one way to mitigate the legal threat to open
robotics is to immunize manufacturers of open robotics platforms for
the actions and improvements of third parties.263  This strategy has
seen success in the context of firearms and Internet content264 and
could be designed to preserve incentives for safety.  The immunity
could eventually sunset and be supplemented by a market for con-
sumer robot insurance.265
Of course, another way to approach the issue of liability for per-
sonal robotics would be to wait until cases surface of their own accord.
The well-known advantages of this ad hoc approach include the ability
to proceed incrementally and to apply precedent to actual facts.266
Courts were thus able to domesticate liability in the context of com-
puters.267  For example, five years before Congress intervened,268 at
least one court anticipated the problem of holding websites accounta-
ble for content posted by third party users and looked to the First
Amendment to limit liability.269
Mar. 23, 2011) (claiming that the Rovio weighs only five pounds); iRobot Roomba 530,
IROBOT, http://store.irobot.com/product/index.jsp?productId=3881234&cp=2804605.25
01652&view=compare&s=D-StorePrice-IRBT&parentPage=family (last visited Mar. 21,
2011) (claiming that the Roomba 530 weighs only 8.3 pounds).
263. See supra Part V.A.
264. See supra text accompanying notes 226–40. R
265. See supra Part V.B.
266. See Nuno Garoupa & Thomas S. Ulen, The Market for Legal Innovation: Law and
Economics in Europe and the United States, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1555, 1588 (2008) (noting that “a
common law judge’s decision of a dispute is not an instantiation of an explicit theory for
resolving disputes of the type before him or her” because “common law judges work incre-
mentally, fitting seemingly new fact patterns into existing precedent”).
267. See supra text accompanying notes 191–94. R
268. See supra text accompanying notes 235–37. R
269. See Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 139–42 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(“The requirement that a distributor [here an Internet bulletin board operator] must have
knowledge of the contents of a publication before liability can be imposed for distributing
that publication is deeply rooted in the First Amendment . . . .”).
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There are several problems with waiting.  First, there could be
incalculable costs to innovation as investors and entrepreneurs wait
for a test case.  It would be difficult to say where general aviation
would be today had Congress not waited for the industry to bankrupt
before passing GARA.270  Second, given initial robotics applications
such as eldercare, the facts of a lawsuit are not likely to be favorable to
the manufacturer-defendant.  Extremely sympathetic early plaintiffs
could lead to a high profile and recovery and hence a heavy disincen-
tive.  Third, in the time it takes for domestic courts to sort out liability,
other countries with a higher bar to litigation and a head start may
leap far ahead.271  The unprecedented economic success of the
United States has turned in part on its ability to drive technological
innovation.272  Most of the transformative technologies of the twenti-
eth century, including computers and the Internet, originated in
America.273  Other countries are, to some extent, still catching up.274
The robotics revolution will take a coordinated, global effort.275
It is possible that, absent a shift in priorities, the United States will not
be a comparatively serious player in this effort.276  Countries such as
Japan have invested heavily in robotics.277  Japan has also begun to
develop personal robotics standards, due out as early as 2012.278  Even
if these standards prove infeasible or unhelpful, Japanese products lia-
bility law is less developed than that of the United States, and litiga-
270. See supra text accompanying notes 219–21. R
271. See supra text accompanying notes 39–42. R
272. See SINGER, supra note 1, at 238 (acknowledging that technological innovation was R
“America’s pathway to power”).
273. See ZITTRAIN, FUTURE OF THE INTERNET, supra note 18, at 11–12, 26–30 (describing R
the American origins of computers and the Internet). But see id. at 29 (noting that a Uni-
versity of Tasmania employee wrote the piece of code that permitted early PCs to connect
to the Internet by modem).
274. Christopher Mims described one example of this “catch-up” in a 2009 article: “The
Chinese purchased 39.6 million [PCs] in 2008. . . .  But the vast majority of PCs sold in
China are running central processing units created by the US companies Intel and AMD.”
Christopher Mims, People’s Processor: Embrace China’s Homegrown Computer Chips, WIRED MAG.
(Dec. 21, 2009, 10:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/magazine/2009/12/st_essay_china.
275. Cf. SINGER, supra note 1, at 244–45 (noting that China’s approach to technology R
development depends in part upon its “openness to ideas and technology from abroad”).
276. See, e.g., id. at 241 (“Not only do U.S. military robotics developers and makers face
huge competition, but many think that they are already behind the field in certain ar-
eas. . . .  Warned one scientist, ‘The small U.S. humanoid robot community is at risk of
being overwhelmed by foreign research, development and commercialization.’”).
277. Id. at 242 (noting that “[a]bout a third of all the world’s industrial robots are in
Japan” and asserting that “Japan’s success with robotics and [artificial intelligence] comes
from a long history of strong government support”).
278. See supra note 253. R
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tion faces greater cultural barriers.279  The same story can be told
about South Korea, which has set an official state goal of having a
robot in every home by 2020,280 as well as China, the European
Union, and several other countries.281
It is for these reasons this Article has set aside the usual concerns
of robotics and the law regarding the nature of personhood and
agency in favor of a discussion of the short-term prospects of commer-
cial robotic products.  On our current course, we may never reach
those other interesting questions.  To ensure that we do, cyberlaw
must begin to concern itself with how the law should receive personal
robotics—lest we risk losing out on a key technology of our age.
279. For an overview of modern Japanese products liability law and its origins, see Mark
A. Behrens & Daniel H. Raddock, Japan’s New Product Liability Law: The Citadel of Strict Lia-
bility Falls, but Access to Recovery Is Limited by Formidable Barriers, 16 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 669
(1995).  An analysis of how Japanese law might apply to open and closed robots is beyond
the scope of this Article.
280. SINGER, supra note 1, at 243–44 (describing investment in the Korean robotics R
industry).
281. See id. at 244–46 (describing robotics investment in China); see also ROADMAP FOR
U.S. ROBOTICS, supra note 39, at 1 (“Unfortunately, the United States lags behind other R
countries in recognizing the importance of robotics technology. While the European
Union, Japan, Korea, and the rest of the world have made significant R&D investments in
robotics technology, the U.S. investment, outside unmanned systems for defense purposes,
remains practically non-existent.”).
